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Abstract:
Comprehensive Environmental
Environmental Response, Compensation
Compensation and
Abstract: The Comprehensive
("CERCLA") was hastily enacted
Liability Act ("CERCLA")
enacted in 1980 in the wake of the
Love Canal disaster, where vast amounts of toxic wastes were found buried
beneath
beneath a residential
residential community. The contours of this legislation, though
comprehensive in its outward scope, have been difficult
difficult to discern, largely
largely as
a consequence
consequence of vague and confusing
confusing expression.
expression. Though often the first
tool resorted to for interpretation
interpretation is the dictionary, the courts
courts have looked
looked
beyond
determine the intended
beyond the literal terms, in an effort to determine
intended and sensible
congressional aim to reach broad categories
limits, consistent
consistent with both the congressional
of responsible parties and conduct, as well as with long-settled
long-settled principles on
the burdens that come with land ownership
ownership and enterprise. The most recent
Supreme Court
Burlington Northern
Northern &
Supreme
Court decision
decision interpreting
interpreting CERCLA, Burlington
&
Santa Fe Railway Co.
Co. v. United
United States,
States, recognized
of
Santa
recognized the challenges of
applying the statute and seemed to affirm
affirm the approach
approach taken by the lower
lower
courts. That approach stands in clear contrast to what appears
appears in other areas
to be a determined march by federal courts toward the federalization of
of
property
property law-either
law-either by redefining
redefining or reshaping well-settled
well-settled common
common law
concepts or by devising a federal concept
concept calculated to serve particular
federal interests. These maneuvers,
maneuvers, where they are not principled
principled and ignore
historical rationales for the state law concept, threaten
threaten to undermine
undermine the
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law's validity
validity and
and legal
legal theory. The approach
approach taken
taken in interpreting
interpreting CERCLA
CERCLA
law's
of
should guide federal
federal courts
courts in preserving
preserving the
the historical
historical importance
importance of
should
common law
law concepts. Understanding
Understanding CERCLA
CERCLA teaches
teaches us
us about purposive
purposive
common
decisiomnaking.
decisionmaking.
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Purposive legislation. Purposive
Purposive acts. Purposive
Purposive decisionmaking. This
framework
framework for statutory
statutory understanding
understanding may be discerned
discerned in a decision
decision by
by
the United
States
Supreme
Court
last
term,
Burlington
Northern
&
Santa
United
Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co.
Co. v. United
United States,
States/1 where
where the Court was called upon to
"arranger" for the disposal of hazardous
hazardous
determine what it means to be an "arranger"
wastes, within the meaning of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response,
Response, Compensation,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
("CERCLA,,).22 Congress
enacted
1980 in the wake of the Love Canal disaster, where it
enacted CERCLA in 1980
was discovered that a residential
residential community had been built atop a toxic
toxic
waste dump.
dump.33 Though the conduct of the polluters could have been

1. 129
1.
129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
2. Comprehensive
Comprehensive Environmental
1980,
2.
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
9601-9675 (2006)).
3. Molly J.J. Walker Wilson &
Publicity, Pressure,
Pressure,and
andEnvironmental
Environmental
3.
& Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity,
Legislation: The Untold
Untold Story of
ofAvailability
Campaigns,30 CARDOZO
CARDOZo L. REV.
Availability Campaigns,
REv. 2147, 2195Legislation:
96 (2009) (stating
(stating CERCLA was enacted just over sixteen months after the Love Canal
disaster climaxed). In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
1950s, Love Canal, an area located in New
twenty-thousand tons of liquid chemical wastes. Schools and
York, was filled with over twenty-thousand
homes were then constructed on this dump site. The original developer of the area
envisioned a dream community, but economic
envisioned
economic conditions diverted the use for industry. The
harmful externalities
externalities were ignored; indeed, literally covered
covered up with a thin veneer of soil.
Later, the dream of a community was again pursued, but with horrific results. When the
grim tale emerged,
emerged, scores of different compounds
compounds (many carcinogenic) had
had begun
grim
percolating upwards through
through the soil, drum containers rotting and leaching
leaching their contents
percolating
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negligence,4
addressed by existing state common
common law, such as nuisance
nuisance and negligence,4
comprehensive federal legislation. It seems easy
easy
Congress stepped in with comprehensive
to characterize
characterize the act of dumping, then burying toxins so negligently,
negligently, so
so
Congress's
wantonly as an offense
offense to the nation
nation and our posterity. But, Congress's
intent with CERCLA can be described in many respects
schizophrenicrespects as schizophrenicon the one hand, it states that in applying the act, courts should embrace
common law principles;
comprehensive measure,
measure,
principles; on the other, it is a broad, comprehensive
overrule, state common law
which by its terms seem to extend, if not overrule,
principles
categories of potentially responsible
principles by identifying
identifying broad categories
responsible parties
(starting with owners)
owners) and wide ranges of actionable conduct. 5 But, the
statute is rife with vagueness and omission-it does not define "owner"
"owner" or
or
clearly state what "disposal"
"disposal" means.66
In interpreting CERCLA, it seems
seems that the main task of the courts has
been to mediate between its aggressive
aggressive agenda and upsetting settled
settled
common law notions about liability, reliance,
and
expectations
that
come
reliance,
from ownership of property. They
of
They have employed
employed the usual canons of
construction;
Webster's, the ordinary
ordinary dictionary, to
construction; they have looked to Webster's,
explain ordinary words, but then they have looked, responsibly,
responsibly, to state law
into the backyards and basements. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal
Tragedy, EPA
Canal Tragedy,
EPA
JOURNAL,
1979, http://www.epa.govihistory/topics/lovecanaIJOI.htm.
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/0 l.htm.
JOURNAL, Jan. 1979,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
821D (1977).
(1977).
4. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §
§§§ 432, 82ID
5. "Potentially
parties," include landowners where the wastes are
5.
"Potentially responsible parties,"
discovered;
facility disposing of such wastes;
wastes; arrangers
arrangers of the disposal of such
discovered; operators of a facility
wastes;
wastes; and transporters
transporters of such wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
criticized the statute for vagueness and confusing
6. Many
Many courts have criticized
confusing language.
language. See,
e.g.,
(5th Cir. 1990)
1990) (stating that
e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 677 (5th
CERCLA
'acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted
vaguely-drafted provisions
CERCLA has '''acquired
provisions and an
contradictory, legislative history.
history.'"
'" (quoting United States v. Mottolo,
Mottolo, 605
indefinite, if not contradictory,
F. Supp. 898, 902, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)));
1985))); HRW Sys.,
Sys., Inc. v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 823 F.
Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md. 1993)
1993) ("[T]he legislative
legislative history of CERCLA gives more insight
insight
into the 'Alice-in-Wonderland'-like
'Alice-in-Wonderland'-like nature of the evolution
evolution of this particular statute than it
does helpful hints on the intent of the legislature."); Rhodes v. County
County of Darlington, 833 F.
1163, 1174 (D.S.C. 1992)
Supp. 1163,
1992) ("CERCLA
("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has
been criticized
attributable to its
criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous
numerous ambiguities
ambiguities attributable
precipitous
passage." (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New
F.2d
precipitous passage."
New Castle County, 851 F.2d
643,
648 (3d Cir. 1988)));
1988))); In re Acushnet River &
& New Bedford Harbor, 716 F. Supp. 676,
643,648
681 n.6 (D. Mass. 1989)
1989) (complaining of the "difficulty
"difficulty of being left compassless
compassless on the
trackless
CERCLA"); United
United States v. Wade,
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa.
trackless wastes of CERCLA");
1983)
self-serving
"unusually riddled by self-serving
1983) (noting that the legislative history of CERCLA is "unusually
and contradictory
contradictory statements"). While a subsequent substantial amendment to CERCLA
attempted
REP. No. 99-253,
attempted to clarify some points, see, for example,
example, H.R. REp.
99-253, pt. I, at 59, 79
(1985), reprinted
reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841,
2841, 2861; S. REp.
REP. No. 99-11,
99-11, at 44 (1985),
(1985),
(1985),
there remains much uncertainty
uncertainty about what CERCLA
William D.
CERCLA does and does not cover. William
Araiza, Text,
Text, Purpose
Facts: The Relationship
Sections 107 and
and 113,
Purpose and Facts:
Relationship Between CERCLA Sections
193, 224 (1996).
(1996).
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
REv. 193,224
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to identify and heed underlying societal
societal interests. As suggested
suggested in the
beginning
"purposiveness" seems
beginning and as will be developed
developed in this Article, "purposiveness"
to be the approach
approach taken by most courts as they strive to give meaning to
various terms and concepts
concepts in CERCLA. While CERCLA presents unique
issues of interpretation, I propose
propose that this framework should guide courts
in identifying
identifying the contours of a federal statute where a literal application of
of
its language threatens
threatens to upset established notions of state law. In Part I, I
will describe CERCLA
CERCLA itself as purposive legislation, aimed to achieve
specific goals. In Part II, I will examine
examine various terms to determine whether
contemplate purposive acts, considering the tools that the courts have
they contemplate
employed toward rational construction. In Part III, I will discuss the notion
of purposive
purposive decisionmaking, exploring what should guide the courts in
their rulings. In Part IV, I show how in recent times, decisionmaking by
federal courts (at least in the realm of property law) has become less
principled
principled and more driven to further some particular
particular federal government
government
interest, thereby
undermining
well-settled
thereby undermining well-settled state law principles. Finally, I
offer conclusions on how this movement
movement threatens the law's validity and
and
legal theory's ability
ability to interpret law and why the approach taken with
CERCLA is the right one.
I. Purposive Legislation: The Aims and Language of CERCLA

CERCLA
CERCLA was designed to promote the "timely cleanup of hazardous
hazardous
waste sites.,,7
sites." 7 It is "sweeping"
"sweeping" in its aims and is designed
designed to ensure that
"everyone who
who is
is potentially
"everyone
potentially responsible
responsible for hazardous-waste
hazardous-waste
contamination may be forced to contribute
cleanup., 8 Absent
contamination
contribute to the costs of cleanup."s
CERCLA's affirmative defenses99 applies, liability
a showing that one of
ofCERCLA's
liability for
lO
owners
While these words seem eminently clear,
owners and operators is strict.10
CERCLA's coverage has been quite vividly described as a "black hole that
CERCLA's

7.
479, 483 (1996);
(1996); Consol. Edison
7. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc.,
Inc., 516 U.S. 479,483
Edison Co. v. UGI
Utils.,
also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
2005); see a/so
Utils., Inc.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005);
Farms
1986).
Fanns Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
8. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,
Pennsylvania v.
51, 56 n.1
n.l (1998)
(1998) (quoting Pennsylvania
Union Gas Co.,.491
1,21 (1989)
(1989) (Brennan,
Co.,491 U.S. 1,21
(Brennan, J., plurality
plurality opinion)).
opinion».
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)
9607(b) (2006)
(2006) (enumerating three statutory
statutory defenses to CERCLA
"(1) an act of God; (2)
(2) an act of war; and (3) an act [of an independent,
liability: "(1)
landowner
intervening] third party"); see also
a/so § 9601(35)(A)
9601(35)(A) (providing that the innocent
innocent landowner
defense
defense precludes
precludes liability upon showing that "the
"the real property
property on which the facility
placement of the
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement
concerned is located was acquired
hazardous
hazardous substance
substance on, in, or at the facility").
10. See B.F. Goodrich
1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992).
10.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
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indiscriminately devours all who come near it."ll
it."' 1 The core legislative
indiscriminately
legislative
purposes of the statute, though, are relatively
clear.
The
final
version
relatively
version was a
compromise among
competing bills then under consideration
consideration by
among three competing
1
Congress: House of Representatives
Representatives Bill 85 ("H.R. 85"),
85"),12
of
2 House of
13
Representatives
Representatives Bill 7020 ("H.R. 7020"),
7020"),13 and Senate Bill 1480 ("S.
1480"). 14 H.R. 85 targeted oil pollution
1480,,).14
pollution by establishing a comprehensive
comprehensive
compensation for oil-spill damage and clean-up
clean-up
system of liability and compensation
costs.' 55 H.R. 7020 was intended
costS.1
intended to regulate
regulate inactive waste sites by
16
By its terms, it
establishing reporting, monitoring
monitoring and clean-up schemes. 16
applied only to hazardous waste sites, and did not purport to address all
hazardous releases.
releases.'177 The third bill, S.
S. 1480,
1480, was by far the broadest and
of
most ambitious of the three competing
competing measures, covering "all
"all releases of
environment,
not
merely
discharges
hazardous chemicals
chemicals into the environment,
spills
or
discharges
8
disposal sites.'
abandoned waste disposal
from abandoned
sites.,,18
II. Purposive
Purposive Acts
How have the courts gone about discerning the reach of CERCLA?
Some have been
been highly formalistic in their approach,
approach, employing a textual
analysis, with the concerns
concerns about CERCLA's
CERCLA's impact being of secondary
considered the impact of CERCLA on
consideration. Others
Others have carefully
carefully considered
broader
cases, the courts seem
seem
broader notions of fairness and responsibility. In all cases,
to begin with the general rule that the starting point is the language of the
20
applied as
language is
statutory language
statute; 19 clear and explicit statutory
statute;19
is to
to be
be applied
as written
written20

11. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d
11.
F.3d
Hazardous Waste Land,
1364, 1366
1366 (9th Cir. 1994)
1994) (quoting Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous
Land, 13 VA.
1, 6-7 (1993)).
ENVTL. L.J. 1,6-7
(1993)).
12. Oil Pollution Liability
Compensation Act, H.R. 85, 96th Congo
Cong. (2d Sess. 1980).
Liability and Compensation
13.
Hazardous
Waste
Containment
1980).
Cong. (2d Sess. 1980).
13. Hazardous
Containment Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th
96th Congo
14. Environmental
Environmental Emergency
Emergency Response
Cong. (2d Sess. 1980);
Response Act, S.
S. 1480, 96th Congo
1980); see
generally
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
generally SUPERFUND:
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION
EVOLUTION OF
OF SELECTED SECTIONS OF
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION
LIABILITY ACT xiii
"SuPERFuND"]; Frank P.
P. Grad, A
Mark Menefee
Menefee eds., 1982) [hereinafter "SUPERFUND"];
A
(Helen Needham & Mark
Legislative History
Comprehensive Environmental
History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Response, Compensation
Compensation and
Liability ("Superfund'')
("Superfund") Act
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL.
1-6 (1982).
(1982).
Act of 1980,8
ENVTL. L. 1,
I, 1-6
3.
15. See Grad, supra
supra note 14,
14, at 3.
Id. at 4.
16. 1d.
Id.
17. 1d.
18.
17,989 (1979)
(1979) (comments
of S. 1480);
1480);
18. 125 CONG.
CONGo REC.
REc. SS17,989
(comments of Sen. Culver, co-sponsor ofS.
also 126 CONGo
CONG. REC.
14,964-65 (1980).
(1980).
see also
REc. SS 14,964-65
v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995);
v. Nicklos
19. Bailey V.
(1995); Estate of Cowart V.
Nicklos
(1992); Greyhound Corp. v.
Drilling Co., 505
505 U.S. 469,
469, 475 (1992);
V. Mt. Hood Stages,
Stages, Inc., 437 U.S.
322, 330 (1978);
(1978); Coronado-Durazo
Coronado-Durazo v. I.N.S., 123 F.3d 1322,
1324 (9th Cir. 1997).
322,330
1322, 1324
20. Hughes Aircraft
Co.
v.
Jacobson,
525
U.S.
432,
438
(1999).
432, 438 (1999).
Aircraft CO. V. Jacobson,
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and construed according
according to its ordinary or natural meaning absent clearly
21
expressed congressional
congressional intent to the contrary.
contrary.21
However, if that meaning
policy
leads to absurd or futile results, or one "'plainly at variance with the policy
of the legislation
as
a
whole,'
[courts
must]
follow[]
that
purpose,
rather
legislation
whole,'
follow[]
rather
2
2
words.,,22
than the literal words.
Long ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared for the Court,
"[w]e
"[w]e [the Court] do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
23
what the statute means.,
means.,,23
More recently, in the context
context of CERCLA,
Justice Clarence Thomas, in Cooper
Cooper Industries,
Inc.
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services,
Services,
At
m
244
Inc./
Holmes's view when he stated that
Inc., seemed to embrace Justice Holmes's
"[g]iven
"[g]iven the clear meaning of the text, there is no need to resolve this
dispute or to consult the purpose of CERCLA
CERCLA at all. [Instead,] '[i]t
'[i]t is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns
concerns of
of
25 But, sometimes, the
our legislators by which we are governed.',,
governed. ",25
expressed; sometimes, the operative
legislative intent is poorly expressed;
operative language
language is
at odds with the statute's stated purposes and aims. Sometimes, the
operative terms are words of common parlance
parlance but are being used within
within
the peculiar
peculiar context of the statute, in which case they should be given a
particular meaning
meaning in that context.
statute,2 66 has
Legislative history, a tool of last resort in construing a statute/
2
7
interpreting CERCLA. 27 In varying degrees,
proven to be of little value in interpreting
courts have found an authoritative
authoritative (even dispositive) source for guidance in
Webster's Dictionary.
the plain old Webster's
Dictionary. But, for most, it is just the starting
point.

21.
21. Williams
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,431 (2000); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500-01
(2000); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995);
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S.
(1995); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,
350,
356-57 (1994);
(1994); United States v. Shabani,
(1994).
350,356-57
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994).
22. United
(1940) (quoting Takao
United States
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)
Ozawa
(1922)).
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
23.
COLLECTED
23. OLIVER
OLNER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
Interpretation, in COLLECfED
LEGAL PAPERS
(1920).
PAPERS 207 (Peter Smith ed.,
ed., 1952) (1920).
24. 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (failing to find a section
against
section 113(f) contribution claim against
potentially
potentially responsible party
party absent either a section
section 106 or 107 suit against claimant).
25. Id.
/d. at 167-68 (citing Oncale
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Offshore Servs.,
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(1998)).
(1998)).
26. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841,845-46
841, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts are not free to
substitute legislative history for the language
language of the Act, and legislative
legislative history
history is not an
of
adequate substitute for congressional
congressional action. Escondido
Escondido Mut. Water
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of
Mission
(1984) (citing North
Mission Indians,
Indians, 466 U.S. 765,
765, 772 (1984)
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S.
300, 312 (1983);
(1983); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
102, 108
108
300,312
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
(1980)).
(1980)).
677, 684 (5th
27. Aviall Servs.,
Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,
Inc., 312 F.3d 677,684
(5th Cir. 2002)
2002) (citing
In re
re Bell Petroleum
889, 901 n.13 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889,
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A. "Owner"
"Owner"
As the Fourth Circuit long ago pointed out, "the trigger to liability
under §§ 9607(a)(2)
9607(a)(2) is ownership or operation of a facility at the time of
of
28 Should
disposal, not culpability
culpability or responsibility for the contamination.',
contamination.,,28
Should
"owner" mean
mean something
something different
different under
under CERCLA
"owner"
CERCLA than it does under state
29
law?
law?29 The definition
definition contained
contained in the statute is a tautology:
tautology: "owner"
"owner" is
"any person
owning or
operating [a]
facility" where
"any
person owning
or operating
[a] facility"
where a disposal of hazardous
30
The Ninth Circuit has stated that this definition "is a
substances occurred. 3o
'green' as 'green.',,31
'green." ' ' 3' The courts have taken this circularity
bit like defining 'green'
in the statutory language
language to mean that "the
"the statutory terms have their
their
32
ordinary meanings
meanings rather than unusual or technical
technical meanings.
meanings.,,32 They have
also taken the generality of the term to suggest that Congress
Congress intended
33 In other words,
words, this
courts to employ "common
"common law analogies.
analogies.,,33
"owner" opens up the question whether
whether to apply
tautological definition of "owner"
"owner" or to craft one that
or incorporate
incorporate common law definitions
definitions of "owner"
appears specifically to serve the ends of the statute.3344
While in Burlington,
Burlington, the Court seemed to suggest that liability
ownership,3 5 the lower courts have
attaches solely by virtue of the status of ownership,35
title"not taken that view. Instead, many have held that "bare legal title"without more-is insufficient
insufficient for purposes of liability
liability under CERCLA.3636 In
In

28. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Cir. 1992).
& Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir.
1992).
29. Under common law notions,
notions, ownership is described
described as those six sticks in a bundle of
of
rights giving the right to possess, use, enjoy the fruits and profits, destroy, alienate and to
exclude. The sticks can be owned at different times and by different persons jointly. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter
(1982).
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii)
960 I (20)(A)(ii) (2006).
31. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin
31.
Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d
F.3d
1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994).
1364,
F.3d 417, 419 n.1 (7th Cir.
32. Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters
Pipe fitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d417,
1994) (citing Edward
155, 156 (7th
Materials Co., 861 F.2d ISS,
1994)
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Cir. 1988)).
Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at 157.
33. See Edward
Edward Hines
9601(20)(A)(iii) (exempting from liability persons who merely
34. But see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii)
hold a security interest in the property).
property).
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
35. Burlington
Burlington N. &
United States, 129 S.
S. Ct. 1870, 1878
1878 (2009)
(2009)
(although
(although not ruling on the question, the Court stated that the "Railroads
"Railroads qualify
qualify as PRPs
PRPs
under both §§ 9607(a)(1)
9607(a)(2) because
9607(a)(I) and 9607(a)(2)
because they owned the land leased
leased [out] at the
time of contamination
contamination and continue
continue to own it.").
S-00-113
36. See, e.g., Ameripride
Arneripride Servs., Inc.
Inc. v. Valley Indus. Serv., Inc., No. Civ. S-OO-I13
LLK/JFM,
*19 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2007) (stating that a
LLKlJFM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18806, at *19
person holding title for less than twenty-four hours, who never exercised
exercised any control or
exclusive
exclusive use over the property, was not liable as owner); United States v. Friedland, 152
152 F.
1241-44 (D. Colo. 2001)
2001) (holding legal title not enough to show owner
Supp. 2d 1234, 1241-44
owner
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every case,
case, the
the courts have
have pointed
pointed out
out that
that the starting
starting point
point in
37
The
determining
determining whether
whether one
one is an
an owner
owner is state
state law.37
The inevitable
inevitable
starting point,
point, though,
though, is that a determination
determination may vary
consequence of this starting
consequence
38 In some
from state
state to
to state.
state?8
In
cases, merely identifying
identifying the nature
nature of
of the
the
property
determination whether one is an
an owner.
property interest
interest held, leads
leads to the determination
For instance,
instance, courts
courts have
have considered
considered the nature
nature of an easement
easement or mineral
servitude
they own
own
servitude and
and concluded
concluded that
that holders
holders of these interests, though they
these limited
contaminated site merely
merely
limited interests,
interests, do not become owners of a contaminated
because
because these
these interests give
give rights
rights to use or profit from the underlying
estate. 39 This ruling that "owner"
"owner" means
means owner
owner of the estate is compelled
compelled
by the
the fact that
that many
many easements,
easements, such as the right to plant utility poles,
poles, lay
railroad
railroad tracks, build irrigation
irrigation systems,
systems, pass on foot, and
and preserve
preserve scenic
scenic
40 and no
and
and historical
historical values of the land, are beneficial
beneficial and non-polluting,
non-polluting,40
no
good would be served by imposing
liability
upon
the
holders,
inasmuch
as
imposing liability
holders,
they generally
generally lack
lack the right to interfere
interfere with activities occurring
occurring on the
land.4411
The courts seem in general
general agreement
agreement that a lessee can be an "owner,"
"owner,"
depending upon the extent
extent to which that person exercises the powers
powers and

Castlerock Estates,
1994)
liability); Castlerock
Estates, Inc. v. Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360,
360, 366 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(finding bare legal title was not enough to make one liable
liable as an
an owner). But see City of
of
564, 566-68 (D. Ariz. 1993)
1993) (deeming trustee
Phoenix v. Garbage
Garbage Servs. Co., 816 F. Supp. 564,566-68
"owner" of contaminated
bank as an "owner"
contaminated site, despite absence of involvement in the site's daycontaminated site; legal
to-day operations, but limited to exercising an option to buy the contaminated
title, coupled with paying
paying property taxes and procuring liability insurance were
were requisite
indicia of ownership for liability).
37. See, e.g., Canadyne-Georgia
Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A., 183
(11th
183 F.3d 1269, 1273
1273 (lith
Cir. 1999).
38. See id.
id.
39. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy
F.3d
Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d
1366-68 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
holders of an
1364, 1366-68
(rejecting the imposition
imposition of liability on the holders
easement to run pipelines across the land where the pipeline was in no way connected to the
of
pollution because,
because, under state law "an easement conveys rights in or over the land of
another," but does not mean ownership of the burdened land) (citing, inter
alia, Camp
another,"
inter alia,
1990); 12
12 B.
Meeker Water Sys., Inc. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 799 P.2d 758, 770 (Cal. 1990);
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 434 (9th ed. 1987)
1987) (stating an easement is an
WITKIN, SUMMARY
"interest in
in the land
landof another,
limited use or
"interest
another, which entitles the owner of the easement to a limited
enjoyment of the other's land"».
land")).
40. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369
1369 (citing Pennsylvania v.
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I,
1, 7
40.
(1989)
(1989) (finding that CERCLA "imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the
contamination"));
& Chern.
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
contamination"»; United States v. Reilly Tar &
Minn. 1982)
1982) (agreeing that Congress "intended
"intended those responsible for problems caused by
disposal of chemical
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility
responsibility for remedying the harmful
harmful
conditions they created").
Beach, 32
32 F.3d
F.3d at 1369 n.6.
41. Long Beach,
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42 In Commander
Commander Oil Corp.
Corp. v. Barlo Equipment
rights of a fee holder.42
Corp.,43
whether a nominative sublease was a true
Corp.,43 the central question was whether
owner/lessor
"bookkeeping measure."
sublease or merely a "bookkeeping
measure." At first, the owner/lessor
sublease
warehouse and a second
leased
leased one lot to the lessee for use as offices and a warehouse
second
owner/lessor
lot to another
Thereafter, the owner/lessor
another party
party for use as a fuel depot. 44 Thereafter,
consolidated
consolidated the two leases into one: both lots were leased to the first
lessee, with the responsibility to maintain the property and to pay the
46
45 and that lessee in turn subleased the second lot to the other party.
taxes,45
subleased the second lot to the other party.46
taxes,
After contamination
contamination was discovered, the lessor sought to hold the lessee
47
liable for some of the costs of cleanup.
cleanup.47
In this case
case of first impression, the Second
Second Circuit began
began its analysis
ambiguity within
bemoaning having yet again to resolve "another
"another ambiguity
bemoaning
provisions. ' '48 Despite the broad remedial
CERCLA's miasmatic provisions.'.48
remedial purposes
of the statute, the court believed that CERCLA should not be read to
connection with the
impose absolute liability upon all persons with any connection
facility. 49 The two opposing
facility.49
opposing assertions were that "owner"
"owner" meant on the one
"record owner"; and on the other, one with the right to control
hand, "record
control
property, whether that right stemmed from the right to possess or from
from
50 The court resorted to the dictionaries;
dictionaries; one of the
formal legal title. 50
of law. Webster's seemed
English language and the other of the language oflaw.
seemed to
confirm the second meaning: an owner is "one
confirm
"one that has the legal or rightful
rightful
Dictionary
not., 51 However, Black's Law Dictionary
title whether
whether the possessor or not.,,51
seemed
seemed to embrace both meanings,
meanings, defining an owner as "one who has the
"one who has the
something," and as "one
right to possess, use, and convey
convey something,"

1988);
42. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto
Monsanto Co.,
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 166-68 (4th Cir. 1988);
1:05-CV-0145-CC, 2009 U.S. Dist.
& Assocs. v. BriarcliffCtr.
Briarcliff Ctr. Partners, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-0145-CC,
Scarlett &
LEXIS 90483, at *25-26 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009); Delaney v. Town of Carmel,
Carmel, 55 F.
Overmyer Co., No. C-961999); Nestle USA Beverage
Supp. 2d 237, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Beverage Div. v. Overmyer
*8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1998); Burlington
1207(VRW), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4257, at *8
Burlington N.
1207(VRW),
1384, 1391 (E.D. Wash. 1993); United States v. A
R.R. v. Woods Indus., Inc.,
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1384,
1317, 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
& N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc.,
&
Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317,
1992); United States
1002-03 (D.S.C. 1984).
v. S.C. Recycling
Recycling and Disposal, Inc.,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
984,1002-03
1984).
43. 215 F.3d 321
321 (2d Cir. 2000).
44. Id.
Id. at 324.
45. Id.
Id.
46. Id.
46.Id.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
Id. at 326.
Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 327.
49. Commander
50. Id.
Id.
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
51.
5!. Id.
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
(1981)).
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1612 (1981)).
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primary or residuary title to property.,,52
property., 52 The court remarked that the
ambiguity seemed to reflect the long-standing
long-standing view
view held among scholars
ownership, and consequently
consequently "property,"
"property," was not
that the meaning of ownership,
readily intuitive, but was a concept
concept bound up with social policy and
53 that in finding property,
political philosophy;
philosophy;53
property, the law seeks to mediate
competing
competing claims between persons to enable security and the development
development
54
activities.
productive
and
investment
for
necessary
of expectations
expectations
for investment and productive activities. 54
definition-"ownership" signifying
While at least under the Black's definition-"ownership"
control-imposing
control-imposing owner liability on the basis of site control alone would
threaten
threaten to define all owners as operators
operators and render most of the operatorliability
55 But, what beyond
beyond mere site
liability language
language in the statute superfluous.
superfluous.55
control
is
relevant?
control
It seems the most compelling consideration
consideration for the court was the
overall
overall intent of Congress when it provided
provided for strict liability of the
56 those
potentially
that "enter
"enter into a business or activity
potentially responsible
responsible parties: 56
for his own benefit, and that benefit results in harm to others, should bear
'57
harm.',,57
the responsibility
responsibility for that harm.
But this justification
justification wanes when it is
lessees/sublessors;
offered to support liability upon lessees/sub
lessors; whereas
whereas here, it was the
the
relationship between
between the record
record owner
owner and the sublessee that was
responsible for the release of hazardous waste, and not the relationship
between
lessee's
between the sublessee
sublessee and the lessee/sublessor.58
58 Here, the lessee's
merely
interposition between
between the record owner and the sublessee was merely
formal and not at all substantive
substantive in terms of determining power,
responsibility and benefit. The court expressed concern about disturbing
settled common law notions and expectations
expectations of persons as they assess the
interests in real property. That is, inasmuch as
wisdom of acquiring varying interests
a prospective
prospective buyer of property
property would perform an environmental
environmental
assessment
assessment before purchasing, and whereas a lessee would only look to see
see
that the land was suitable for its purposes, it would be wrong to hold the

52. Id.
Id.(quoting BLACK'S
BLACK'S LAW
LAW DICTIONARY
DICTIONARY 1130
1130 (7th ed. 1999)).
53. Id.
Id.at 327.
54. Id.
Id.at 327-28.
55. See Castlerock
Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 71 F. Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Cal.
1994)
...has become similar to [the]
1994) ("The test for 'ownership'
'ownership' liability
liability under CERCLA ...
test for 'operator'
'operator' liability
liability under CERCLA.").
CERCLA.").
Oil, 215 F.3d at 329
I.
56. Commander Oil,
329 (citing Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E.
L.R.E. &
& L
App. 330 (H.L.)).
57. Id.
(quoting United
United States
States v. FMC Corp.,
Id. at
at 330
330 (quoting
Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1978)).
1978)).
58.
Richard
D. Jones
Jones &
& Ivan
Environmental Risks in
58. Richard D.
Ivan S.
S. DeVoren, Managing
Managing Environmental
Commercial Real Estate
EstateLeases,
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTIN
UING LEGAL EDUC. 121,
121,126.
Commercial
Leases, 1996 A.L.L-A.B.A.
CONTINUING
126.
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lessee/sublessor liable
liable for 59
the conditions
conditions on
on the land,
land, which
which he
he did
did not
not
the
lessee/sublessor
investigate, nor
nor bargain
bargain for.
for. 59
investigate,
6 ° the Seventh Circuit
In United States
States v. Capital
Capital Tax
Tax Corp.,
Corp.,60
the Seventh Circuit
In
considered whether
whether to apply
apply the
the state
state common
common law
law principle-equitable
principle--equitable
considered
of
of the land-or
land-or
conversion,
under
which
a
purchaser
is
regarded
owner
as
owner
is
regarded
purchaser
conversion, under which
a
contract's
during
liability
finding
for
rule
to
adopt
a
new
federal
rule
for
fmding
liability
during
a
contract's
to adopt a new
executory period.
period. Though
Though ultimately
ultimately the court
court found that
that the facts did not
not
executory
establish the
the predicate
predicate for equitable
equitable conversion
conversion under
under state
state law,
law, the
the
establish
of state law
law in the origins
origins and
and development
development of
of property
property in the
the
importance of
importance
Indeed, given
given Congress's
Congress's direction
direction
common law could
could not be discounted. 661' Indeed,
common
use traditional,
traditional, common
common law
law meanings
meanings of ownership,
ownership, "to
"to invent out
out of
of
to use
distinctly federal
federal law of property
property would be
be inappropriate,
inappropriate, if
if
whole cloth a distinctly
62 This
not impossible.,
impossible.,,62
This was
was so
so because
because the contours
contours of
of the
the doctrine
doctrine of
of
equitable conversion
conversion among the states
states was largely
largely the same
same and it seemed
seemed
equitable
law...
property
of
principles
core
alter
"highly unlikely that states would
would
principles of property law ...
"highly
'63 Significantly,
order to affect their
their impact on
on pollution
pollution liability.
liability.,,63
Significantly, the
in order
court believed
believed that not adopting
adopting state
state law might produce
produce inequitable
inequitable rights,
court
inasmuch as "citizens
state law to determine
determine their
their relative
relative
"citizens naturally look to state
inasmuch
"it would
would
obligations with respect
respect to the issue
issue of property" and "it
rights and obligations
seem unfair
unfair for a party who was not an 'owner'
'owner' under state law
law to face
ownership." 64
liability under a federal statute
statute based on ownership.,,64
explained why resorting to state law
While the court
court intelligently explained
equitable title arose made
principles to understand
understand the concept of how equitable
principles
sense, it did not explain why equitable
equitable ownership should suffice
suffice for
liability.65 Equitable conversion is based
CERCLA liability.65
based upon
upon the
purposes of CERCLA
purposes
66
done.,,66
maxim that "equity
considers as done that which [ought] to be done."
"equity considers
This is said to mean that because
because the parties have signed a contract, then it
purchaser as owner
is appropriate to view the purchaser
owner for the purposes of giving
performance
him an equitable remedy of specific performance on the contract. The
59. Commander Oil,
Oil, 215 F.3d at 330. While no doubt there may be instances where a
lessee could be treated as an owner, such as where the lessee holds full control over the
interference from the lessor, those facts were not
activities that can be carried on without interference
330-31; cf Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir.
Id. at 330-31;
present in the case. Id.
1998)
innocent owner exception to liability under CERCLA is not
1998) (noting that the innocent
contamination but is
determined by an entity's involvement
involvement in those activities relating to contamination
status).
founded
founded on the entity's status).
525 (7th Cir. 2008).
60. 545
545 F.3d 525
60.
at 532.
61. Id.
Id. at
61.
Id.
62. Id.
62.
n.6.
Id. at 532 n.6.
63. Id.
63.
Id.
64. Id.
64.
Id. at
at 532-34.
65. Id.
65.
ed. 2009).
(4th ed.
50:42 (4th
A. LORD,
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 50:42
66. 17
17 RICHARD
RICHARD A.
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equitable title otherwise gives the purchaser no rights in or about the
property; it does not entitle him to possession before
before legal title is conveyed,
If
nor the right to interfere with what the legal owner does on the property. If
power
the idea behind putting liability
liability on "owners"
"owners" is that they have the power
equitable
and interest
interest to control activities on the land, then finding an equitable
owner a potentially responsible
party
fails
to
serve
the
purposes
of
responsible
purposes of
CERCLA.
CERCLA.
B. "Operator"
"Operator"
To "operate,"
"operate," on its face, seems to require some intentional,
intentional,
purposive act. This presupposes
presupposes authority
authority and ability to control activities.
Yet, no universal formula for determining
determining such liability has emerged. The
one recurring theme is that courts have broadly construed
"operating" "in
construed "operating"
order to effectuate the perceived
perceived intent of Congress
Congress to extend
extend liability [for
[for
clean up] to all who profit from the treatment or disposal of hazardous
substances. 67 At the same time, courts have been careful not to read
substances.,,67
read
CERCLA
or
CERCLA as creating unlimited liability for those only tangentially or
68
remotely involved with hazardous substances.68
"operator." In
Some courts have fashioned
fashioned specific
specific definitions of "operator."
In
Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical
Chemical Corp.
Corp. v. Catellus
Catellus Development
Development Corp., the
Kaiser
Aluminum &
Ninth Circuit stated that "'operator'
... only attaches if the
'''operator' liability ...
defendant
control the cause of the contamination
contamination at the
defendant had authority to control
69 Other
time the hazardous substances were released
environment.",,69
released into the environment.
Other
courts have focused on actual participation
participation in the management
management of a
70
facility.
The
Supreme
Court
made
clear
in
United
States
facility.7o
Supreme
United States v. Bestfoods
Best/oods that
"operator" liability in the context of a
state common
common law should determine "operator"
71
corporate parent and subsidiary
subsidiary relationship.
relationship.71
Under well-established
well-established

67. THE LAW
LAW OF
OF HAZARDOUS
HAzARDous WASTE:
WASTE: MANAGEMENT,
MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP,
CLEANUP, LIABILITY,
LIABILITY, AND
AND
LITIGATION
14.01[4][c][ii]
& Mathew Bender eds.,
LmGATION § 14.01
[4] [c][ii] (Susan M. Cooke
Cooke &
eds., 2006).

1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68. See Reading
Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 91-2377,
91-2377,1993
LEXIS 2930,
*18, *55
1993).
at *18,
*55 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1993).
69. 976 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1992)
1992) (finding
(finding that a contractor
contractor who was hired to
contaminated soil in the process could be an operator under
excavate land and who contaminated
CERCLA because
because the contractor had sufficient control
control over this phase of the development)
epc Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783,
783, 788 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
(citing CPC
(finding that control
control over the activity causing
causing the pollution is the most important metric)).
70. See Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond
Parr-Richmond Terminal
Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454, 1457
1457
Terminal Co.,
1991) (holding that liability requires a showing of actual participation
participation in the
(N.D. Cal. 1991)
operation of the facility--control
facility-control over, or intrinsic involvement
involvement in, the entity directly
directly
operation
responsible for operations); see also Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army, 801 F.
1992) ("[T]o
Supp. 1432, 1437
1437 (M.D. Pa. 1992)
("[T]o be held liable as an operator, a party must
currently participate
participate in decisions regarding the overall operations
operations at a facility.").
71.
51, 62-64
International Inc.,
Inc., of
71. 524 U.S. 51,
62-64 (1998).
(1998). There, the parent corporation, CPC International
of
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of the
the operating
operating entity
entity without
without more
more
principles, mere
mere ownership
ownership or
or control
control of
principles,
72
is not
not sufficient
sufficient to
to make
make another
another entity
entity an
an owner.
owner.72 Instead,
Instead, in
in order
order for aa
is
parent corporation
corporation to be
be held
held liable
liable for
for the
the acts
acts of
of its
its subsidiar
subsidia?;
parent
7
corporation, the
the corporate
corporate veil
veil must
must be pierced
pierced under
under state
state common
common law.
law. 3
corporation,
The
The instances
instances in which
which the corporate
corporate veil can
can be
be pierced
pierced are
are generally
generally
limited to
to cases
cases where
where the parent
parent has not maintained
maintained sufficient
sufficient separation
separation
limited
from the subsidiary
subsidiary or
or where
where adherence
adherence to the
the corporate
corporate form would
would be
be a
from
74
of
justice.
74
perversion
justice.
of
perversion
At the
the same
same time, aa parent
parent corporation
corporation that
that actually
actually operates
operates the
At
be liable
liable as an "operator"
"operator" under
under CERCLA. The
The Court
Court
subsidiary can
can be
subsidiary
thought that in the
the "organizational
"organizational sense
sense obviously
obviously more
more intended
intended by
by
thought
CERCLA," to operate
operate means "[to
"[to direct]
direct] the
the workings
workings of, manage[],
manage[], or
or
CERCLA,"
the
to...
conduct[]
the
affairs
of
[the]
facility[,]
...
specifically
to
...
related
specifically
...
facility[,]
[the]
affairs
conduct[]
leakage
leakage or
or disposal of hazardous
hazardous waste, or decisions
decisions about
about compliance
compliance with
7
5
environmental
regulations.,,75
environmental regulations.

"Disposal"
C. "Disposal"
CERCLA provides
provides that the meaning
meaning of
of "disposal"
"disposal" shall have the
CERCLA
Disposal Act, which defines
meaning provided in the Solid Waste Disposal
"disposal" as:
"disposal"
[T]he discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
or
placing
placing of any solid waste or hazardous
hazardous waste into or on any land
or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment
environment or be emitted into
waters. 76
including ground
waters, including
any waters,
into any
the air or discharged into
ground waters?6

Almost from the enactment of the statute, there arose a split among
"disposal"
the circuit courts as to whether the statutory definition of "disposal"
encompassed passive migration of hazardous substances or whether an
placement of substances, is
affirmative act, involving some casting off or placement

Ott Chemical Co. had selected the subsidiary's board of directors and appointed the
the Ott
environmental
had aa significant role in developing the subsidiary's environmental
executives. It also had
Id.
compliance policy. Id
at 59.
72. Id.
Id at 62-63.
at 63.
id. at
law. Id.
73. Id
bedrock principle at common law.
Id.at 61-62. This was aa bedrock
74. Id.
Id.
74.
at 62-63.
"to
finding "to
Dictionary, finding
HeritageDictionary,
the American
American Heritage
first looked
looked to the
Court first
Id.at 66 (The Court
75. Id
75.
"to
finding "to
Dictionary,fmding
InternationalDictionary,
to Webster's
Webster's New International
control the functioning
of; run," then
then to
functioning of;
operate aa machine.") (alteration omitted) (citation omitted).
as to operate
work; as
Act, 42
Liability Act,
Response, Compensation, and Liability
Environmental Response,
76. Comprehensive Environmental
76.
(2006).
6903(3) (2006).
U.S.C. §§ 6903(3)
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
Solid Waste Disposal
U.S.C. §§ 6901(29)
6901(29) (2006); Solid
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78 Circuits,
of the
the issue
issue stands
stands the
the Third
Third7777 and
and Sixth
Sixth78
Circuits,
required. On
On one
one side
side of
required.
which read
read "disposal"
"disposal" as
as requiring
requiring affirmative
affinnative human
human conduct.
conduct. On
On the
the
which
79 and
and Fifth
Fifths80 Circuits
Circuits believe
believe that
that passive
passive migration
migration
other side,
side, the
the Fourth
Fourth79
other
of waste
waste isis contemplated
contemplated by
by "disposal."
"disposal." Then
Then there
there are those
those circuits
circuits that
that
of
82 Circuits.
seem to
to straddle
straddle the
the line,
line, the
the Second
Second881' and
and Ninth
Ninth82
Circuits.
seem
States v. CDMG Realty
Realty Co.,83
CO.,83 finding
finding the meaning
meaning of
of the
the
In United States
statutory definition
definition not
not readily
readily intuitive,
intuitive, the Third
Third Circuit
Circuit looked
looked up
up two
two
statutory
in Webster's Third New
New International
International Dictionary,
Dictionary, Unabridged:
Unabridged:
words in
"leak"
"leak" ("to
("to permit
pennit to enter
enter or
or escape
escape through
through a leak")
leak") and "spill"
"spill" ("to
("to cause
cause
84 The court also employed
allow to pour, splash,
splash, or fall out").
out,,).84
employed an
an
or allow
construction, noscitur
noscitur a sociis, requiring
requiring the two terms
tenns
established canon
canon of construction,
established
to be
be read
read together
together with
with the
the surrounding
surrounding words
words in
in the definition
definition
all
of
("discharge, deposit, injection, dumping
dumping and placing"),
placing"), all of which
which
("discharge,
85 Moreover,
"envision[ed]
a
human
actor."
the
court
found that
that treating
"envision[ed] a human actor.,,85 Moreover,
passive
passive migration
migration as disposal would nullify
nullify the innocent-landowner
innocent-landowner
defense
defense since
since no
no one
one could show acquisition
acquisition of the property
property after disposal,
86 it would create the
generally be no such point
point in time;
time;86
would create
as there would generally
anomalous
anomalous result
result that prior
prior owners who had no knowledge
knowledge that their land
land
was contaminated
contaminated would
would fall within the statute's
statute's liability provisions,
provisions, while
87
current owners
owners could assert the innocent
innocent owner
owner defense.87
current
E. Hooper
In Nurad,
Nurad, Inc.
Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co.,88
Co. ,88 the Fourth
Fourth Circuit
read
read certain words in the definition
definition of disposal (leaking
(leaking or spilling)
spilling) as
readily
readily admitting
admitting of a passive component, that did not suggest the need for
89 It believed that an
active human participation
participation for liability to arise.89
affirmative human conduct would frustrate the
interpretation requiring affinnative
interpretation
statutory policy of encouraging
encouraging voluntary
voluntary private acts to remedy
v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713-18 (3d Cir. 1996).
77. United States v.
Cir. 2000).
78. United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705-06 (6th Cir.
& Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1992).
William E. Hooper &
79. Nurad, Inc. v. William
1568, 1573 (5th
Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,
Tanglewood E. Homeowners
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
80. Tanglewood
Cir. 1988).
1997)
Inc., 120 F.3d 351,
351, 357-59 (2d Cir. 1997)
Prime Tech.,
Tech., Inc.,
81.
81. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime
"no opinion" on whether "prior owners are liable if they acquired a site with
(expressing "no
leaking barrels [and] the prior owner's actions are purely passive.").
Cir. 2001).
2001).
F.3d 863
863 (9th Cir.
Village, LTD, v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d
82. Carson Harbor Village,
1996).
(3d Cir.
Cir. 1996).
83.
83. 96 F.3d 706 (3d
UNABRIDGED 1285
DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED
INTERNATIONAL DICIlONARY
WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
84.
at 714
714 (citing
(citing WEBSTER'S
84. ld.
Id.
1986)).
Gove ed.,
ed., 1986».
(Philip Babcock
Babcock Gove
(Philip
at 714.
85.
at
85. ld.
Id.
Id.
716.
86. ld.
86.
at 716.
at 717.
87. ld.
Id.
87.
at
1992).
837 (4th
(4th Cir.
Cir. 1992).
88. 966
966 F.2d
F.2d 837
88.
89.
at
89. ld.
Id.
at 845.
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environmental hazards
hazards and would
would create
create the
the anomalous
anomalous situation
situation where
where a
environmental
owner would have full liability
liability to
to clean-up
clean-up whereas
whereas a former owner
owner
current owner
who sat
sat by allowing
allowing hazards
hazards to fester would
would not
not be liable.
liable. Such aa regime,
regime,
who
90
Congress could not have intended.90
91
the Ninth Circuit
Unocal Corp.,
Village, Ltd. v. Unocal
Carson Harbor
Harbor Village,
COrp.,91
In Carson
of contaminants
contaminants is not actionable
actionable
position that passive
passive migration
migration of
took the position
CERCLA. But it did not adopt a categorical
categorical rule. Rather, the words
under CERCLA.
92
statute were
were applied to the facts of
of the
the case.
case.92
When the facts only
only
When
of the statute
"the gradual
gradual passive
passive migration
migration of
of contamination
contamination through
through the soil"
soil" it
present "the
cannot be regarded
regarded as a "discharge,
"discharge, deposit,
deposit, injection, dumping,
dumping, spilling,
cannot
substances.9933 None of these
these terms
terms described
described the
leaking or placing"
placing" of substances.
leaking
gradual, subtle
subtle spread through
through the soil
activity sought to be addressed-the
addressed-the gradual,
activity
contaminants. Nothing was
was deposited
deposited by a human
human actor; nothing spilled
spilled
of contaminants.
94 The
anything; nor leaked out of any container.94
The court thus
out of or over anything;
rejected the "absolute
"absolute binary
binary 'active/passive'
'active/passive' distinction
distinction used
used by other
other
95
courtS.,,95 Further, examining the statute as a whole, construing
construing "disposal"
"disposal"
courts.
including passive soil migration
migration alone, but allowing for instances
instances in
as not including
which passive migration might be actionable was consistent
consistent with
CERCLA's purposes. That is, passive
passive owners who are responsible
responsible for the
CERCLA's
conduct and for passive
passive
migration of contaminants
contaminants that results from their conduct
migration
migration will ensure prompt
prompt clean up and efforts aimed at preventing
preventing
96
another
compelled by another
This reason seemed to be compelled
spills and leaks.96
important consideration-imposing
consideration-imposing liability upon
upon all owners for passive
important
migration would entirely confuse
confuse the categories of responsible parties as
become a "perpetual
process" and every landowner after
"perpetual process"
disposal would become
the first disposal would be liable. At the same time, a purely active
active
meaning would nullify the strict liability scheme embraced by the statute.9977
Either view can be seen as requiring
requiring a purposive act before imposing
imposing
landowner to become vigilant about
liability. If the end is to cause the landowner
monitoring activities
activities occurring on the land, that is, to become
become a good
monitoring
steward, then the Fourth Circuit's view should prevail. If, on the other
other

90. Id.
Id. at 845-46.
91. 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001). There, Carson Harbor Village owned and operated a
mobile home park on the land, that had previously been leased to Unocal for petroleum
petroleum
above-ground storage tanks, and other production
production,
production, using oil wells, pipelines, above-ground
Id. at 868.
facilities. The runoff from these operations
operations made its way into the wetlands. Id.
Id. at 875-77.
92. Id.
93. Id.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 879.
94. Id.
Id. at 879.
95. Id.
881.
Id.
96. !d.
at 881.
Harbor,270 F.3d at 883.
CarsonHarbor,
97. Carson

HeinOnline -- 44 New Eng. L. Rev. 849 2009-2010

850

LAW REVIEW
NEW ENGLAND LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 44:835
44:835
[Vol.

hand, the aim is simply to
to impose
impose the burdens of the injury
injury caused
caused by
by
unwise,
harmful
activities
on
those
responsible,
then
the
Third
Circuit's
unwise, harmful activities
responsible,
the Third Circuit's
view
line with
with common-law
common-law
view should
should control.
control. The latter
latter view
view seems
seems more
more in line
CERCLA was enacted.
landowner tort liability
liability as it had evolved
evolved when CERCLA
enacted. 98
However, the nuanced
nuanced view taken
taken by
by the
the Ninth Circuit, to the extent
extent it
imposes liability
liability upon one who
who put the migration in motion, but
but not
not upon
upon
one who
who merely
merely purchases
purchases a property after the fact, seems
seems aa sensible
medium between
between the two ends.
ends.
D. "Arranger"
"Arranger"
CERCLA
CERCLA imposes
imposes liability on any
any person
person who
who arranges
arranges "by contract,
contract,
or otherwise"
otherwise" for the "disposal
"disposal or treatment...
treatment ... [or]
[or] for
agreement, or
transport for disposal or treatment"
"hazardous substances"
treatment" of "hazardous
substances" that are
99 On
"owned
person. 99
On the face of it, the phrase "to
"to
"owned or
or possessed"
possessed" by
by that
that person.
arrange...
arrange. .. for the disposal"
disposal" is clear and straightforward.
straightforward. But does it
contemplate
discard waste,
waste, or are mere
contemplate a formal agreement
agreement or plan to discard
transfers
sufficient? Before Burlington,
transfers to others who later discard sufficient?
Burlington, this
question
question arose quite often but was not always
always resolved
resolved on consistent
consistent or
or
coherent principles.
principles.
coherent
In GenCorp,
Inc. v. Olin Corp., the court
GenCorp, Inc.
court determined the meaning
meaning of
of
°°
"arranger,"
by
reference
to
Webster's,1
which
defined
"arrange"
"arranger," by reference to Webster's, 100
"arrange" as
meaning to '''plan
"'plan or prepare'
prepare' for it, though not necessarily to implement
implement
10' This conception
the plan."
plan."lol
conception of arrange
arrange "d[id] not require a formal disposal
agreement, as the statute
statute provides that a person may arrange for hazardous
hazardous
10 2
waste disposal 'by
otherwise.'",102
Moreover,
'by contract, agreement or otherwise.
"neither
the arrangements
arrangements for
for waste
disposal stem from a discrete
"neither must
must the
waste disposal

(9th
98. See Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corporation,
Corporation, 227 F.3d 1196, 1207
1207 (9th
also Elf Altochem N. Am., Inc.
Cir. 2000); see also
Inc. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (noting
(noting that the disposal occurred at a facility where owner
owner discharged hazardous
substances through a pipe to be carried
carried to a waste pond); Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1253 (D.NJ.
(D.N.J. 1989) (relying on Webster's,
Webster's, disposal means "giving
"giving
Co.,
... a disposing of,
of, getting rid of");
of'); United States v. Hardage, CIVaway, transfer, bestowal ...
Dist. LEXIS 17877, *10,
*10, 15
15 (W.D. Okla. 1989)
1989) (relying on Webster's
86-1401, 1989 U.S. Dist.
86-1401,1989
"application" to conclude that disposal of used pesticides did not fall within the
definition of "application"
"pesticide application"
"pesticide
application" exception).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(3)
9607(a)(3) (2006).
100. 390 F.3d 433, 445 (6th Cir.
Cir. 2004). In the 1960s, GenCorp, Inc. and Olin Corporation
entered into an agreement under which Olin built a manufacturing
manufacturing plant to produce urethane
eventually deposited offsite
offsite into a
foam, which generated hazardous
hazardous wastes that were eventually
Id. at 437.
landfill. Id.
101. Id.
(2001)); see
101.
Id. at 445 (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY
DICTIONARY 62 (2001»;
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 63-64 (3d
(3d ed. 2008).
WEBSTER'S
102. GenCorp,
GenCorp,Inc., 390 F.3d at 445 (citing 42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3».
9607(a)(3)).
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10 3
Therefore,
event; they
they may
may arise
arise from
from aa broader
broader 'transaction."",
'transaction.",103
Therefore, a
event;
generated
waste
of
handling
the
construction agreement
agreement that
that contemplated
contemplated
the
handling
of
waste
generated
construction
04
by the
the plant
plant created
created arranger
arranger liability.'
liability.l04
by
In setting
setting the
the limits
limits of arranger
arranger liability,
liability, the
the courts
courts have
have created
created the
the
0
1
5
albeit
exception.105 One
One who
who isis merely
merely selling
selling aa useful,
useful, albeit
useful-product exception.
useful-product
hazardous, product
product to
to an
an end
end user is
is not
not liable
liable as
as an
an arranger
arranger for what
what the
the
hazardous,
06
But, an
of the sale.'
sale. 106
purchaser does
does with
with the
the product,
product, simply
simply by
by virtue
virtue of
purchaser
entity "that
"that manufactures,
manufactures, sells,
sells, or
or installs
installs aa useful
useful product
product that
that is
is intended
intended
entity
into
substance
a
hazardous
directs
hazardous
substance
into the
direct, and
and when
when used
used as designed, directs
to direct,
07
as an
an arranger.'
arranger. 107
environment," can be
be liable
liable as
environment,"
Even
Even if a useful
useful product
product is involved,
involved, the courts
courts have
have looked
looked beyond
beyond
of the parties to examine
examine their ultimate
ultimate
mere formal relationship
relationship of
the mere
as well
well as their
their respective
respective involvement
involvement with
with the
the substances'
substances' use
objectives as
objectives
08 the
Cello-Foil Products,
Products, Inc.,
Inc.,108
the court
and disposal. In United States v. Cello-Foil
of solvents
solvents in the drums
drums
leaving significant
significant amounts of
found that by leaving
containing them-from
them-from one-half
one-half tea cup to one-half
one-half gallon-knowing
gallon-knowing that
containing
the producers
producers would
would remove
remove the solvents when reclaiming
reclaiming the drums, an
the
inference was raised
raised that
that the purchaser
purchaser intended
intended aa disposal of the
inference
0
9
appropriate even though
product. 109 This inference of intention was appropriate
product.'
CERCLA contemplates
contemplates strict liability
liability because
because of the language
language usedused"otherwise arranged
arranged for
for disposal."llo
disposal."'" 0 This general
"otherwise
general term, "following
"following in a
series [of]
[of] two specific terms and embrac[ing]
embrac[ing] the concepts similar to those
of 'contract'
'agreement,,,,lll instructed
instructed the court to inquire "into what
'contract' and 'agreement,"""
transpired between
between the parties and what the parties had in mind with regard

103. Id.
Id.
Id.at 446.
104. Id.
1999);
160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999);
105. See, e.g.,
e.g., Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc.,
Inc., 189 F.3d 160,
&
Uniroyal Chern.
Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 257 (5th Cir. 1998); Fla. Power &
1990).
(1 1th Cir. 1990).
1317 (11th
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317
281, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1992)
Transmissions, Inc.,
106. Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions,
Inc., 962 F.2d 281,
over hazardous waste disposal..
control over
to exercise control
(concluding that an "obligation
disposal .... makes
"obligation to
an entity an arranger under CERCLA's liability provision").
the rule declared by
Cir. 2005) (adopting the
107. Berg v.
v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
also AM
Popham, 113 P.3d 604, 612 (Alaska 2005)); see also
Alaska Supreme Court in Berg
Berg v.v. Popham,
(finding that a
1993) (fmding
(6th Cir.
Cir. 1993)
989, 992, 999 (6th
Int'l v. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989,
solutions had been
sale
an "as is, where as" basis, where certain solutions
an industrial facility on an
sale of an
for disposal of wastes).
arrangement for
and not an arrangement
asset and
left
left in place, was a sale of a useful asset
1996).
Cir. 1996).
100 F.3d
F.3d 1227 (6th Cir.
108. 100
108.
1233.
Id.
1230, 1233.
109. Id.
109.
at 1230,
Cir.
1507 (6th Cir.
1497, 1507
889 F.2d
F.2d 1497,
v. R.w.
R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889
United States v.
110.
at 1231 (citing United
Id.
110. Id.
1985)).
(6th Cir.
Cir. 1985)).
F.2d 263,266
263, 266 (6th
Adm'r, EPA, 767 F.2d
v. Adm'r,
& Co. v.
1989);
J.V. Peters
Peters &
1989); J.V.
47.17,
CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.17,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
SINGER, SUTHERLAND
NORMAN J. SINGER,
111.
2A NORMAN
Id.(citing 2A
111. Id.
Cir. 1995)).
1995)).
21, 23
23 (6th Cir.
46 F.3d 21,
Simpson, 46
v. Simpson,
1992); Woods v.
at
(5th ed. 1992);
at 188 (5th
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' 2 With this intent factor in
substance.""
to disposition of the hazardous substance.
,,112
in
mind, the court concluded that a trier of fact could conclude
conclude that the parties
arrangement [a] sale
sale of a useful hazardous
did not intend by this "deposit arrangement
"transactions [in] matters
substance for its original intended purpose"
purpose" or as "transactions
drums." ' 1 3 Instead, getting rid of the contents of the
involving only the drums.,,113
arrangement.114
the arrangement.
of the
critical part
was aa critical
substances) was
114
drums (i.e., hazardous substances)
part of
What if the producer/seller of hazardous
hazardous substances is aware of
of
actionable conduct by the purchaser? That was the scenario
scenario presented
actionable
presented in
in
Burlington during the 2008-2009 Term.
Term."lls5 In that case, in 1960, Brown &
Burlington
Bryant, Inc. ("B&B") operated
operated a chemical
chemical distribution facility on land
others."1166 B&B purchased
purchased chemicals, including pesticides, from
owned by others.
17
land.'117
Shell Oil Company and stored them on the land.
The chemicals were
delivered to B&B by tanker trucks, then transferred
transferred to other containers on
the site.1I8
site. 1' 8 During the transfer, chemicals would
would invariably spill to the
ground."
instruction and
ground. 1I99 Shell tried to help B&B avoid the spills through instruction
20
discounts for safe transfers. 120
The EPA and the California Department of
of
Toxic Substances Control sued B&B, as an operator;
operator; the land owner, as an
21
wastes.1121
owner; and Shell, as an arranger for the disposal of wastes.
Shell argued
argued
CERCLA because it was
that it should not be liable as an arranger
arranger under CERCLA
merely delivering a useful product to the operator, not arranging for
for
22
disposal. 122 However, the Ninth Circuit found the company
liable
largely
23
them. 1123
of them.
and Shell
because spills were
were routine
routine and
Shell was
was aware
aware of
Examining
"arrange" meant, the Court
Examining the statute
statute to understand
understand what "arrange"
identified
identified the two clear
clear cases
cases at either
either end of the inquiry:
inquiry: on the one
one end, an
entity
entity that enters into a "transaction
"transaction for the sole purpose
purpose of discarding a
used and no longer useful
useful hazardous
hazardous substance;"
substance;" and on the other, an entity
that merely sells "a
"a new and useful product
product and the purchaser
purchaser of that
product later, and unbeknownst
unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a
' 124
way that led to contamination.'
contamination.,,124
In the former case, liability as an

112.
112.
113.
113.
114.
115.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
121.
122.
122.
123.
123.
124.

Cello-Foil
1231.
Cello-Foil Prods.,
Prods., Inc., 100
100 F.3d at 1231.
Id.
1232n.1.
Id. at 1232
n.1.
Id.
Id. at 1232.
Burlington
Santa Fe
Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
(2009).
Burlington N. & Santa
Id.
/d. at
at 1874.
Id.
/d.
Id.
Jd. at 1875.
Id.
Jd.
Id.
Jd.
Burlington
Burlington N.,
N., 129 S. Ct. at 1876.
1876.
Id.
!d. at
at 1877.
Id.
!d.
Id.
1878.
!d. at
at 1878.
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25
"arranger" is clear and in the latter, non-liability
clear.'125
The
"arranger"
non-liability is equally clear.
difficult area includes those where "the seller has some knowledge
knowledge of the
buyers' planned
'sale' of a hazardous
buyers'
planned disposal or whose motives for the 'sale'
126
substance are less than clear."'
clear.,,126
Resolution of cases in the gray area
substance
examination of the facts, by looking beyond
require close examination
beyond the label the
27 Heeding
Heeding the canon of
parties have attached
attached to their relationship. 127
of
construction that ordinary
construction
ordinary words be given their ordinary meanings, the
Court looked to MerriamWebster's Collegiate
CollegiateDictionary
Dictionaryand found that it
Merriam- Webster's
"arrange" as "to make preparations
preparations for: plan[;]
... to bring about an
defines "arrange"
plan[;] ...
agreement or understanding
settle.' 2 8 The obvious
agreement
understanding concerning:
concerning: settle.,,128
understanding
understanding of these terms is that some intentional acts are necessary
necessary for
liability as an arranger.

While it is true in some instances an entity's knowledge that its
product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or otherwise
otherwise discarded
discarded
may provide
evidence
of
the
entity's
intent
to
dispose
of its
provide evidence
hazardous wastes, knowledge
alone
is
insufficient
to
prove
that
knowledge
an entity
"planned
for"
the
disposal,
particularly
when
the
entity
particularly
disposal occurs
as
a
peripheral
result
of
the
legitimate
sale
of
an
occurs
peri~heral
product. I2
useful product.
unused, useful
Indeed, the Court concluded,
concluded, in order to satisfy the definition of arranger,
Shell
Shell needed to agree to the sale of hazardous substances with the intention
that a small portion would be disposed during transfer by either
discharging, depositing, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking,
leaking, or placing
placing as
described
in
§
6903(3).130
6903(3).130 Here, no facts showed that Shell intended
intended for the
described
spills to occur when the product
product was31 delivered. Indeed, Shell tried, though
to reduce
unsuccessfully, to
unsuccessfully,
reduce the
the Spills.1
spills. l3I
Although
"arranger"
Although at first blush Burlington
Burlington seems to have narrowed
narrowed "arranger"
liability
liability under CERCLA, on closer examination, and inasmuch
inasmuch as the
decision
decision did not rest entirely upon a literal dictionary definition, it leaves a
considerable opening
opening for liability. The gray area of difficult cases identified
considerable

125. Id.;
1993),
/d.; see also
a/so Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp.,
Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751
751 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1044 (1994)
"arranged for" implies
cert. denied,
(1994) (concluding
(concluding that the term
tenn "arranged
"intentional
"intentional action").
126. Burlington
Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879.
1879.
id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
Indus.
Id. (internal
(internal quotations omitted). The Court also cited
cited with approval, Amcast Indus.
Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993)
1993) and United
United States
States v. Cello-Foil
Prods.,
Corp.
Cel/o-Foil Prods.,
Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
1996).
BurlingtonN.,
N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
129. Burlington
130. Id.
Id.
131. See United States v. Burlington
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918,960
918, 960 (9th Cir.
131.
Burlington N. &
2008).
2008).
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by the Court seemed
Cello-Foil,which the Court
seemed to describe
describe the scenario of Cello-Foil,
32 Under the
"arranger"
reasoning there, one can be an "arranger"
cited with approval. 1132
notwithstanding
notwithstanding the absence of a formal contract or agreement for the
disposal of wastes and absent communication
communication between the producer
producer of the
hazardous
substances and one who takes control
hazardous substances
control over the disposal, if the
seem
logical result of such relationship is disposal of wastes. What does seem
clear though, is that the Court intended
that
CERCLA
should
not
be
read
to
intended
impose liability merely on the basis of a sellerlbuyer
seller/buyer relationship,
relationship, not even
unlawfully
with knowledge
knowledge that the purchaser of a useful product may be unlawfully
disposing that product. Instead, some purposive act by the would-be
would-be
responsible party is required.
III. Purposive Decisionmaking
Decisionmaking
The objective of any court ruling is to do justice-to
justice-to the law, the
pUblic. What is the just course or result is not easy to
parties and to the public.
discover and is often burdened or clouded
clouded by the politics of the
decisionmakers
decisionmakers and/or the subject of the case. It is a fallacy to think that
deductively decided
decided through the operation of an exact, consistent
consistent and
law is deductively
complete
complete system;
system; rather, it is the case that common law judges do legislate,
they decide cases
cases by reference to their beliefs about what is expedient for
the community, using their own judgment
judgment as to the worth of competing
133
values. 133

Burlington ruled
132. Burlington
Burlington N.,
N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879. Many other cases decided before
before Burlington
ruled
on the various
"arranger" liability
liability without resorting to the dictionary. See,
various permutations of "arranger"
e.g., American
American Cyanamid
Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6 (1st
(1st Cir. 2004) (stating that while
while
mere brokering the disposal of hazardous
hazardous waste, without more, will not give rise to liability,
where that broker does so by exercising control over the waste, such as finding a site and
dumped at the site, that control can amount to
arranging to pick up the waste and for it to be dumped
of liability); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84
84
constructive possession
possession for purposes
purposes ofliability);
F.3d 402 (lIth
(11 th Cir. 1996)
1996) (holding that landowners who merely contracted
contracted for the aerial
spraying of their crops were not arrangers for purposes of clean-up of the site where
pesticides
of
pesticides spilled
spilled on the airstrip during the mixing
mixing and loading
loading into the application tanks of
1995) (precluding
(precluding
the planes);
planes); United States v. Vertac Chem.
Chern. Corp.,
Corp., 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995)
liability merely because
regulatory authority
authority over
over the activities absent
because of statutory and regulatory
responsibility for the transportation
supervision or responsibility
transportation or disposal of substances or
showing of supervision
Lederer Co., 282
282 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D.
supplying raw materials); United States v. Atlas Lederer
Ohio 2001)
2001) (selling
(selling junk
junk batteries to a scrap
scrap lead company that extracted the lead and never
resold as whole batteries was an arrangement
arrangement for disposal); Cal. Dept. of Toxic Substs.
Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp.,
Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 930 (E.D. Cal. 2003)
2003) (taking spent
battery parts to smelting
smelting plant for recovery
recovery of lead).
133. OLIVER
OLIVER WENDELL
WENDELL HOLMES,
133.
HOLMES, JR.,
JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW AND
AND ITS INFLUENCE 140
(Steven 1.
J. Burton
Burton ed.,
ed., 2000).
2000). Holmes
Holmes believed
believed that
that judges should
should be upfront about the fact
(Steven
of legislating. Such an admission
admission would leave
leave them freer to openly
openly consider
consider competing
policies that really determined their decisions and more likely adopt the best rule as opposed
opposed
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resolving legal issues is a gra:dual
Usually the process of resolving
gradual one, but
sometimes the courts see fit to make a stark break with existing rules, by
sharply expanding or establishing new rules. But, the new law must be
viewed as having evolved from existing law as judges strive to follow
134
analogies and anchor their decisions in existing principles. 134
This process
may be ignored in the case of a federal court ruling on claims involving
individual state common law rights and federal claims where the case is
is
individual
resolved upon the facile assertion
by
the
government:
federal
preemption,
assertion
government:
preemption,
thereby ignoring all conventions and customs bound up with the state
common law rights.
significant impacts of CERCLA are on the common
The most significant
common law
meanings of ownership of property, landowner
landowner liability and the right to
35 provides
contribution from joint
contribution
joint tortfeasors.
tortfeasors. The Supremacy
Supremacy Clause
Clause 135
provides
unambiguously, "that
if
there
is
any
conflict
between
federal
and state law,
"that
federal law shall prevail.,,136
prevail.' 36 Preemption may be implied (where the federal
137
But, it is not categorical;
categorical; it is
regulatory scheme is pervasive) or express. 137
disfavored and should not occur "in
"in the absence
persuasive reasonsreasonsdisfavored
absence of persuasive
either that the nature
nature of the related subject
subject matter permits no other
other
ordained."'' 38
unmistakably so
conclusion, or that the Congress
conclusion,
Congress has
has unmistakably
so ordained.,,138
special concern
concern to states are at issue,
Nonetheless, even when matters of special
39
not preclude
does not
such as real property, this circumstance
circumstance does
preclude preemption.,
preemption. 139

to one driven by their peculiar
peculiar political and economic
economic sympathies. See id.
id.
e.g., Javins
134. See, e.g.,
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
1970)
(requiring landlords to repair property while rejecting
independent covenants);
rejecting concept of independent
1985) (rejecting
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625,
625, 629 (Fla. 1985)
(rejecting caveat emptor); Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (N.J. 1967)
1967) (rejecting old rule as to when
broker's commission
commission is earned).
135. "[T]he
"[T]he Laws of the United
be...
135.
United States ...
... shall be
... the supreme
supreme Law of the Land...
Land ...
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST.,
CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
29 (2005).
136. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
1,29
137. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
(1977).
& Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &
& Tile Co.,
311, 317 (1981).
(1981).
138. Chicago
Chicago &
Co., 450 U.S. 311,
(1962); see also Mansell v. Mansell,
581,
139. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663,
663, 666 (1962);
Mansell, 490 U.S. 581,
(1989); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987);
(1987); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54587 (1989);
(1981) (discussing
55 (1981)
(discussing that even in areas of law typically left to the states,
states, like domestic
domestic
relations, federal law still may preempt state law; federal anti-attachment
anti-attachment provisions
serviceman's life insurance policies preempted state law property
regarding serviceman's
property family
(1981) (holding
(holding that militarysettlement rules); McCarty
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981)
property laws); Hisquierdo v.
retirement pay provisions preempted
preempted state community
community property
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979);
(1979); Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding
1974 preempts any state
1991)
(holding Employee Retirement Income Security
Security Act of 1974
community property law which
predeceasing nonemployee spouse with
community
which arguably
arguably provides a predeceasing
a testamentary
testamentary interest in a fully vested surviving
surviving employee spouse's pension benefits).
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Yet, the
courts
the federal
federal
courts assert
assert a stricter
stricter inquiry
inquiry where these kinds
kinds of matters
matters
14
0
issue.
140
are
issue.
at
are
But, what
what is a conflict?
conflict? In
In United States v. Kimbell
Kimbell Foods,
Foods, Inc.,141
Inc./ 41 the
the
Court observed
observed that it had consistently
consistently held
held that federal law governs
governs
questions
questions involving
involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide
1142
42 When
federal
programs.
When the federal
federal government
government is asserting
asserting claims no
federal
different
different from
from those an individual might assert, is preemption
preemption appropriate?
appropriate?
Even
Even where
where federal courts
courts do not
not explicitly
explicitly speak
speak the language
language of
of
preemption,
preemption, they avoid the application
application of state rules, such
such as of property,
property,
often
often on the mere finding
finding of some federal interest.
While
While CERCLA
CERCLA provides
provides that it applies "[n]otwithstanding
"[n]otwithstanding any
any other
other
'1 43 it does not provide for a complete preemption
provision
law,,,143
complete preemption
provision or rule of law,"
44 and
of otherwise
otherwise applicable
applicable state law,'
law,l44
and does
does not anticipate
anticipate that all
all
of
45 As the
responsible
responsible parties will be held accountable
accountable in all circumstances.
circumstances.1 145
Supreme Court has stated, "there is no federal policy that the fund should
Supreme
should
alone
are
insufficient
to
justify
"more money
arguments"
always win,"
win," and "more
arguments"
alone
insufficient
146
state law.
of state
displacement of
law. 146
displacement
preemption is that sometimes it is necessary
necessary for
One consequence
consequence of preemption
federal courts
spoken
courts to craft federal common
common law. When Congress
Congress has not spoken
on a particular
particular issue, and when there exists a "significant
"significant conflict between
between
47
some federal
federal policy
policy or interest and the use of state law,"'
law,,,147
federal courts
140. Hines v. Davidowitz,
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 n.22 (1941)
(1941) (stating that evidence
evidence of a
congressional
preempt state law should be even clearer when federal law fails to
congressional intent to preempt
address a subject
subject matter that is "peculiarly adapted to local regulation").
141. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
"whether contractual liens
141.
(1979). There, the Court addressed the issue
issue "whether
arising
certain federal loan programs take precedence over private
private liens, in the absence
arising from certain
of
ofaa federal statute setting priorities."
priorities." Id.
Id. at 718.
142. See id.
id. at 726 ('When
is
('''When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is
exercising
constitutional function or power
....
of
exercising a constitutional
power....
In [the] absence of an applicable Act of
Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
governing rule of law according
their
according to their
standards."' (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
own standards.'"
(1943))).
143. 42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
143.
165, 177 (2d Cir. 2007); Bedford Affiliates
144. Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165,
Affiliates v. Sills,
156 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1998); see generally
generally B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
156
F.2d
1192, 1198 (2d Cir.
Cir. 1992).
1192,
145. Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321,
321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000)
connection
("[N]either does CERCLA automatically assign liability to every party with any connection
contaminated facility."). In other words, CERCLA's cost-recovery
cost-recovery objective, while
to a contaminated
considerations.
countervailing considerations.
strong, is not absolute and may yield to countervailing
O'Melveny &
& Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1994)
(1994) (discussing
(discussing federal
146. O'Melveny
common law in the context of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act).
63, 68 (1966);
(1966); see
see City of Milwaukee
Milwaukee
147. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
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1 48
to develop
necessary, in
in a "few
"few and
and restricted"
restricted" instances,
instances,148
develop
have found itit necessary,
1149
49
federal common
common law. Indeed, said
said the
the Court in United States v. Little
Land Co.:
Co.:
Lake Misere Land

At the very least, effective
effective Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism requires
recognition
recognition of
of power in the
the federal courts to declare,
declare, as a matter
matter
of common
common law or judicial
judicial legislation,
legislation, rules
rules which may be
necessary
necessary to fill in interstitially
interstitially or otherwise
otherwise effectuate
effectuate the
statutory
statutory patterns enacted
enacted in the large by Congress.
Congress. In other
other
competence
words, it must mean recognition
recognition of federal
federal judicial competence
to declare
declare the governing
governing law in an area
area comprising
comprising issues
government
substantially related
related to an established
established program
program of
of government
substantially
.

operation.
operatIOn.

1;0

say that it is a "necessary
"necessary expedient"''
expedient,,151 but may be used
That is to say
15 2
In O'Melveny
even
explicitly authorized
authorized by Congress. 152
0 'Melveny &
& Myers v.
even if not explicitly
"cases in which judicial
FDIC,
FDIC, the Court noted that "cases
judicial creation
creation of a special
. . , limited
...[are]
federal rule would be justified[]
justified[] ...
[are] 'few
'few and restricted'
restricted' ....
limited
to situations
situations where
where there
there is a 'significant
'significant conflict between
between some
some federal
153
policy or interest
interest and the use of state law."",
law. ",153
Matters left unaddressed
unaddressed by
policy
scheme are presumably
presumably left subject
a comprehensive
comprehensive federal
federal statutory scheme
subject to the
disposition provided
provided by state
state law-there
law-there must exist a discrete conflict
conflict with
an important federal policy
Eolicy before a court
court should
should consider
consider resorting to
determining whether such a conflict
conflict exists, the
federal common law.
law.'I 44 In determining

inconsistency in
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 n.7 (1981)
(1981) ("In this regard we note the inconsistency
Illinois' argument and the decision of the District Court that both federal and state nuisance
Illinois'
law apply to this case. If state law can be applied, there is no need for federal common law;
if federal common law exists,
exists, it is because
because state law cannot be used.").
(1963).
148. Wheeldin
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
363, 367 (1943).
(1943).
See, e.g., Clearfield
149. See,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
States, 318 U.S. 363,367
"Federal
J.Mishkin, The Variousness
Variousness of "Federal
150. 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
(1973) (citing Paul J.
State Rules for
Decision,
and Discretion
Choice of National
Law ":Competence
Competence and
National and State
for Decision,
Law":
Discretion in the Choice
105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957)).
(1957».
v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006,
151. See Comm. for Consideration
151.
Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v.
1008 (4th Cir. 1976).
1976).
Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 366-67. The Court pointed out that even
Clearfield Trust
152. See Clearfield
common law may
without an explicit statutory grant of authority, the fashioning of federal common
still be appropriate
appropriate when duties and rights of the United States are at issue. The Court went
on to rule that a uniform federal rule should apply in an action by the United States on a
Misere Land
Land Co., 412 U.S. at 593-94
guaranty made on a federal check. See Little Lake Misere
guaranty
proprietary transactions
(explaining
(explaining that the right to seek legal redress for duly authorized proprietary
was "a federal right").
(1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
153. 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)
(1966)).
68 (1966».
Inc., 440
440 U.S. 715,726,728
715, 726, 728 (1979).
(1979).
States v. Kimbell
Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
154. United States
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Court has identified
identified three
three factors: the need for uniformity
uniformity of law across the
nation; "whether
"whether application
application of state law would frustrate specific
specific objectives
application of a federal
of the federal programs"; and "the
"the extent to which application
law."', 55
commercial relationships
rule would
would disrupt commercial
relationships predicated
predicated upon
upon state
state law.,,155
As shown above, CERCLA left much unsaid, undefined and
unexplained.
of
unexplained. Yet, courts have been reluctant to craft a new language of
liability, out of whole cloth. This reluctance
reluctance stands in contrast to what
seems to be a determined
determined march of federal law into the realm of property
rights and a broadening of the notion of federalism, particularly
particularly through
156
The original division of power
power
Commerce Clause. 156
exercise of the Commerce
of
between state and federal governments contemplated
contemplated that only matters of
national importance
importance would be reserved to the federal government. Yet, over
over
the last few decades, the federal presence
presence in areas traditionally viewed as
being within the province of the states
states has grown at a remarkable pace. The
responsibility
for
educating
children, 57 the essential requirement
requirement for an
responsibility
our children,157
58
enforceable contract
land,
and how much interest a lender
lender may
enforceable
contract for land,158
159
charge
were matters traditionally
traditionally reserved to the
charge on a mortgage loan,
loan,159
states, but are 6now
subject
subject to pervasive and sometimes burdensome federal
0
prescriptions. 1160

Id.at 728-29.
155. Id.
156. See Sam
& Catherine
156.
Sam Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,
Federalization, 53 UCLA
L. REv.
1353, 1365
REv. 1353,
1365 (2006) (discussing the increasingly broad
broad reach of the federal
government
Commerce Clause to preempt
government through the Commerce
preempt many state laws).
157. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
1425
157.
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified
20 U.S.C.).
of20
(codified as amended in scattered sections of
158. See,
158.
See, e.g., Electronic Signatures in Global Commerce and National Commerce
Commerce Act,
Pub. L. No.
No. 106-229,
amended in scattered
15
106-229, 114
114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified
(codified as amended
scattered sections
sections of 15
U.S.C.).
159. See,
Sav. &
159.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2006); see also Fid. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. De Le
Cuesta,
141, 159 (1982)
(1982) (upholding
of
Cuesta, 458
458 U.S.
U.S. 141,
(upholding preemption of state laws limiting operation of
due-on sale clauses
clauses in mortgages).
160. Many states have challenged the No Child Left Behind Act and have lost. See
Michael
Challenge 'No Child Program,'
WASH. POST, Apr. 21,
21,
Michael Dobbs, NEA, States Challenge
Program,' THE
THE WASH.
2005,
A21, available
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4741-2005
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlarticles/A4741-2005
2005, at A21,
Apr2O.html;
Faces Medley o/Changes,
of Changes, KANSAS
KANSAS CITY INFoZINE,
INFOZINE,
Apr20.html; Pauline Vu, No Child
Child Law Faces
Mar. 28,
28, 2007,
2007, http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/21900/.
http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sidl21900/. States are
still grappling
grappling with the E-Sign legislation, as many trial courts have refused to accept
accept its
provisions. See, e.g., Vista Developers
Developers Corp. v. VFP Realty
Realty LLC, 847 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (Sup.
Ct. Queens
Queens Co. 2007)
2007) (holding that signed e-mail did not satisfy the statute of frauds in a
real estate
estate transaction).
transaction).
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A.
A. The Virtues of
of State Common
Common Law
Law
This march
federal law
law is a marked
marked departure
departure from common
common law.
march of federal
In the generic sense of the term, the
the "common
"common law"
law" has
has been
been defined
defined as
as
In
of England":
England": "the
"the body of those principles
principles and
"the ancient unwritten
unwritten law of
"the
action relating
relating to the government
government and security
security of persons
persons and
rules of action
property, which derive
derive their
their authority
authority solely from usages
usages and customs
customs of
of
property,
courts
the
decrees
immemorial
antiquity,
judgments
and
decrees
of
courts
judgments
from
the
or
antiquity,
immemorial
customs.,,161 A.W.B.
recognizing, affirming
affirming and enforcing
enforcing such
such usages
usages and
and customs."''
recognizing,
existence
Simpson once
once noted that if the common
common law's existence is thought of as a
Simpson
of rules, "it is in general
general the case that one cannot
cannot say what
what the
the common
common
set of
162
is.,,162
because it is impossible
impossible to demark
demark conclusively
conclusively such a
law is.'
This is because
law
legal thought
"As a system
system of
oflegal
thought
corresponds to the common law. "As
rule set that corresponds
common law ...
... is inherently incomplete,
incomplete, vague
vague and fluid ....
.... ,,163
the common
Professor
Professor Simpson
Simpson writes:
The ideas and practices
practices which comprise
comprise the common
common law are
dependent upon
customary...
customary
... in that their status is thought to be dependent
conformity
sense
conformity with the past, and they are traditional in the sense
of
transmitted through time as a received
received body of
that they are transmitted
learning.... Such rules...
rules ... serve also as guides
knowledge and learning....
proper practice is in part
part the normal
properpractice,
to proper
6practice, since the proper
. 164
practice.
practIce. X

The noted jurist Roscoe Pound believed
believed the common law was a mode
65
of decisionmaking-guided
decisionmaking-guided by past judicial precedents.
precedents. 1165
Despite the
identified by Simpson, there is yet unity in the common
chaos and fluidity identified
law, which has been attributed to the "fact
"fact that law is grounded
grounded in, and
1
66
logically derived from, a handful of general principles."'
principles.,,166 For Blackstone,
167
accumulated wisdom of ages"; 167
it embodies an
"fraught with the accumulated
law is "fraught
ancient wisdom, which may be timeless and yet continually
continually evolving
evolving
161. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co.,
161.
Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901)
(1901) (citing BLACK'S
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY
DICTIONARY 232 (1st ed. 1891)).
AND
in LEGAL
LEGAL THEORY
and Legal
Legal Theory, in
162. Brian Simpson, The Common Law and
THEORY AND
162.
1986).
8, 16 (William Twining ed., 1986).
COMMON LAW 8,
163. ld.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20-21.
164. ld.
(1921). He goes on to
165. ROSCOE
ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 182 (1921).
165.
identify the spirit of the common law as residing in among other things, "judicial
case-by-case decision-making guided by past judicial precedents; a
(pragmatic case-by-case
empiricism" (pragmatic
method of working that "combines certainty and power of growth [of law] as no other
Id.
doctrine has been able to do"). ld.
POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE:
166. ROGER COITERRELL,
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
COTTERRELL, THE POLmcs
(1989).
To LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 24 (1989).
TO
Id.
167. ld.
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68
experience.' 168
A system based in custom can function
function
through collective
collective experience.
only if it is able to insist upon
cohesion
in
traditional
continuity
and
cohesion
ideas
169
ideas. 169
these ideas.
to these
adherence to
and adherence
Property
Property law factors prominently
prominently within the common law. Decades
ago, the Supreme
interests..,
Supreme Court declared: "Property
"Property interests
... are not created by
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
dimensions are defined
defined
by existing rules and understandings
understandings that stem from an independent
independent source
such as state law.,,170
law." 170 Property issues arise not only when the question is
whether
whether to recognize
recognize an asserted interest as property, but also when there is
a question of the extent and contours
contours of that interest, such as how the
interest
may
be
created,
when
rights
expire, when the interest
interest
created,
interest can be
171
171
heirs.
to
passes
it
how
and
attached
attached
how it passes to heirs.
Property
Property does more than simply protect what people have; it also
protects
protects what they might acquire,
acquire, that is, their "expectations"-the
"expectations"-the right to
172 Protecting
realize any future value arising out of that present ownership.
ownership.ln

Id.
at 28.
168. Id.
169. SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN,
LETWIN, ON THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF LAW
LAW 337-38 (Noel B.
Reynolds ed., 2005).
2005).
also
170. Bd. of Regents
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);
(1972); see also
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984)
(1984) (citation
(citation omitted);
omitted); Hughes v.
(1967) (Stewart, 1.,
J.,concurring) ("[A]s
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967)
("[A]s a general
general
proposition[,]
property is, under [the]
[the] Constitution,
Constitution, left to the individual
proposition[,] the law of real property
States to develop and administer."). The Court has also stated: "The great body of law in
this country which controls acquisition,
acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property,
property, and defines
the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is found in the statutes
state." Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,
(1944).
Davies Warehouse
Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155
155 (1944).
and decisions
decisions of the state."
particularly true with respect to real property, for "[e]ven
"[e]ven when federal [common]
[common]
This is particularly
law was in its heyday
heyday [under the teachings of Swift v. Tyson] an exception
exception was carved out
property." United
United States v. Little Lake
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,
580,
for local laws of real property."
(1973).
591 (1973).
171. Any of the rights inhering
171.
inhering in property can
can be transferred separately (wholly,
partially, or temporally)
temporally) and subdivided
subdivided (several
(several people can simultaneously
simultaneously hold rights in
the same thing). In such cases, the task becomes detennining
determining the particular
particular limited rights
United States v. Gen. Motors
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
each transferee or co-owner
co-owner holds. See United
(1945) (stating
citizen's
378 (1945)
(stating that property
property includes "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's
relation to the physical
THOMAS C.
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it"); THOMAS
GREY, LIBERTY,
LIBERTY, PROPERTY
PROPERTY AND THE
Ownership gives power and
GREY,
THE LAW
LAW 69-70 (2000). Ownership
and
Morris Cohen, Property
Property and
sovereignty over oneself, things and other persons. See Morris
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 12 (1928).
(1928). That is because, if "somebody...
Sovereignty,
"somebody ... wants to use
the food, the house, the land, or the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my
consent." Id.
Id. Fundamentally,
Fundamentally, the law of property thus enables
enables an owner
owner to exclude others
consent."
from using what is determined to be hers. But as Professor
Professor Cohen explains, "it by no means
means
follows that [an
[an owner] may use [his property] arbitrarily or that his rule shall prevail
prevail
indefinitely
death." Id.
15.
Id. at 15.
indefinitely after his death."
172. "[P]rotecting
.. rights of a landlord means giving him the right to collect rent,
172.
"[P]rotecting ....
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expectations
allows
expectations
allows intelligent
intelligent choices
choices about
about investment,
investment, consumption
consumption and
and
73
saving. 173
B.
B. Social
Social Construct
Construct Through
Through Conventions
Conventions
chooses to recognize
Those
Those expectations
expectations are bounded
bounded by what
what a state
state chooses
recognize
or
as entitled
entitled to protection. This
This means
means that certain
certain private
private expectations, or
as
desires, of property
property owners
owners may not be supported
supported by the state
state and
and therefore
therefore
desires,
are not recognized
recognized as
as property.
property. The prevailing
prevailing conception
property is
conception is that property
are
74
This means
a social
means that while
social instrument;
instrument; itit exists to serve
serve human
human needs.'
needs. 174
there are some bedrock
bedrock principles that protect
protect property,
property, those same
there
principles
principles are not etched in that bedrock. Instead, as human needs
needs change,
change,
and
communities
property,
created
rights.
Communities
so do property
pro~erty
created property, and76communities can
5
7
law.'176
property
words,
other
In
property is
is aa creation
creation of
of law.
it. I 5 In other
curtail it.'
77 described property
Treatise of Human Nature,'
David Hume, in AA Treatise
Nature,177
described
78
spontaneously from:
"conventions"1 that arise spontaneously
rights as "conventions,,178
a general sense of common interest;
interest; which sense
sense all the members
members
to
which induces them
them to
of the society express to one another, and which
rules....
regulate their conduct by certain
certain rules
.... [T]he actions of each
each
of us have
have a reference
reference to those of the other, and are perform[ed]
perform[ed]
upon the supposition,
s~~position, that something
something is to be perform[ed]
perform[ed] on the
other
other part.
part. 179

A convention
convention is generally
generally a shared
shared understanding
understanding or implicit
implicit
expectation that others
others will
agreement, adhered to because
because of a general expectation
follow.18o
follow.' 80 Conventions arise in response to a felt need, then as routinely

protecting the property of a railroad or a public service
service corporation
corporation means
means giving it the right
... goods
. . . ownership ...
. . . determines
to make certain charges. Hence ...
determines what share of ...
171, at 13.
supra note 171,
13.
various individuals
individuals shall acquire."
acquire." Cohen, supra
ALA.
Real Property,
Property,58 ALA.
Create-orDestroy-Wealth
Destroy-Wealth in Real
173. Richard A. Epstein, How to Create-or
REV. 741,
741, 748 (2007).
L. REv.
369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
1971).
174. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369,372
reverters have been
175. For example, the duration of real covenants
covenants and possibility of reverters
limited to thirty years, unless recorded or renewed by the interested parties, and then they
are only enforced
enforced by damages
damages and not an injunction. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 345
30 (2008).
27,30
(McKinney 2006); MASS.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 27,
"[p]roperty
176. Bentham wrote that property "is entirely the work of law," "[p
]roperty and law are
born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-69 (Richard
ceases." JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY
laws, and property ceases."
Hildreth
1975).
Hildreth trans., 1975).
(1740).
1965) (1740).
177. Book 3, Part 2, §2 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1965)
177.
Id. at 490.
178. /d.
179. Id.
179.Id.
(Peter Newman
THE LAW
LAW 454 (peter
ECONOMICS AND THE
180. THE
THE NEW PALGRAVE
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
180.
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practiced, take
They guide
guide behavior
behavior and
and set the
the
take on the
the force
force of law. They
contours
8'
obligations. lSI
contours of rights and obligations.
Should
Should CERCLA
CERCLA aim to overrule
overrule common
common law
law principles?
principles? Does
Does it
aim to
to ensure
ensure justice
justice for those
those injured
injured by dangerous
dangerous activities?
activities? Ensure
Ensure that
the burdens
burdens of remedying
remedying the effects
effects of these
these dangerous activities
activities fall upon
upon
the actors?
Encourage
honest
and
good
behavior?
Punish
bad?
actors? Encourage honest and good behavior?
bad? Such
Such
questions
questions are part
part of
of the debate among
among the circuits
circuits on
on whether
whether "disposal"
"disposal" of
of
hazardous
hazardous wastes
wastes encompasses
encompasses passive
passive migration resulting in liability
liability to
to all
all
who happen
contaminated land
haPEen to own contaminated
land or instead requires
requires active human
conduct1
whether a mere
mere titular owner
owner is an
an "owner"
"owner" for purposes
purposes of
of
conduct I8 22 and whether
83
CERCLA liability.'
liability.183
CERCLA
84
By the twentieth
had
twentieth century,
century, natural
natural law as a legal philosophy
philosophyl84
had
become
described in
become eclipsed
eclipsed by legal positivism. The legal system was described
terms of its normative
normative functions, that is, of "'ought
"'ought propositions,'
propositions,' which
which
could be, within
within [their] own terms,
terms, valid and illuminating, regardless of the
moral quality of those
those norms, and indeed
indeed independent of all extraneous
extraneous
1 85 Roscoe Pound stated that:
values.,,185
ethical, social, economic, or political values.
[T]he law is an attempt
attempt to reconcile, to harmonize, [or]
[or] to
compromise..... overlapping
compromise.
overlapping or conflicting interests, either
through securing them
them directly and immediately, or through
through
... so as to give effect
securing certain
certain individual
individual interests ...
effect to the
most in
in
greatest number
number of interests or to the interests that weigh186
sacrifice of
least sacrifice
the least
with the
our civilization, with
of other
other interests.
interests. 186

ed.,
1998).
ed., Stockton Press 1998).
181. See, e.g.,
e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
(1926) (standing
181.
Realty Co.,
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(standing for the
presence of land use regulations);
view that conventions
conventions are seen in the pervasive presence
regulations); Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty
Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071,
1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (requiring
(requiring landlords
landlords to keep
rented premises
1985) (establishing
premises habitable); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985)
requiring sellers of real property to disclose
a movement away from caveat emptor and requiring
dangerous conditions in the premises).
dangerous
accompanying notes 76-98.
182. See discussion,
discussion, supra
supra at text accompanying
accompanying notes 28-66.
183. See discussion,
discussion, supra
supra at text accompanying
"[a] philosophical system of legal and moral principles purportedly
184. Natural law is "[a]
universalized conception of human nature or divine justice rather than from
deriving from a universalized
legislative or judicial action" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1127 (9th ed.
ed. 2009).
185. JOHN MAURICE KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 356 (1992).
(1992).
185.
other words,
words, the
the legal
legal "ought," the
the norm, was viewed
viewed as of aa purely formal character,
In other
subject to
to evaluation
evaluation of its
its own
own terms
terms and
and logic,
logic, not of any other scientific or sociological
sociological
subject
standards.
186. Roscoe
Roscoe Pound,
Pound, A
Theory of
of Social
Social Interests,
Interests, in
in READINGS
READINGS IN
INJURISPRUDENCE 238,
186.
A Theory
245-46 (Jerome
(Jerome Hall
Hall ed.,
ed., 1938).
1938).
245-46
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The
The law
law can
can legitimately
legitimately impose
impose liability
liability on conduct
conduct without
without any
any
blameworthy.
or
otherwise
pretense
pretense that
that such conduct
conduct is morally
morally wrong
otherwise blameworthy.
Law operates
ogerates by either
either the threat
threat of "the
"the bayonet"
bayonet" in one's back or "the
"the
Law
88 suggested
rope." 8877 The great
great legal
legal pragmatist
pragmatist Oliver
Oliver Wendell Holmes
Holmes l88
suggested
rope.'
contemporaneously may
may have little
little to do with
that rules we apply contemporaneously
accomplishing any particular
particular social purpose. Instead,
Instead, the "purpose"
"purpose" of law
accomplishing
power and will of the majority backed
backed up by "the
may simply reflect the power
club and the bayonet ready to' 89drive
drive you to prison
prison or to the rope if you go
lines."'
established
the
beyond
established
lines.,,'89
beyond
How legal principles
principles are derived
derived is found in Holmes's most famous
"[t]he life
life of the law
law has not been logic:
logic: it has been
been
aphorism that "[t]he
' 90 It seems
experience.,,190
seems that
that by this phrase Holmes meant
meant that there
there are
experience."'
191 Instead,
often no general principles
resolve various disputes. 19
principles available to resolve
he pointed out that the "[
c]ommon law [is] the result of courts using the
"[c]ommon
doctrine of precedent
precedent to create
create a body
body of rules out
out of individual
individual decisions,
using fiction and equity
equity to adapt those rules to gradual
gradual social
and using2
change." 192
change."'
But this cynical
cynical view cannot be entirely embraced, for as Habermas
Habermas
validity,... [as] a matter of its normative
normative
pointed out, the "[1]aw's
"[l]aw's validity,...
coherent system
system of meaning,
meaning, as prescriptive
prescriptive ideas
character, its nature
nature as a coherent
supported by reason, '' in
capacity to make claims supported
and values[, rests upon its] capacity
citizens." 93
between citizens.,,193
on agreement
discourse that aims at and depends on
agreement between
a discourse
"socially effective"
This means that the legal system
system must be "socially
effective" and "ethically
"ethically
justified."
Habermas argued that in order for law to retain its claim to
justified." Habermas
cognizant of fundamental
fundamental changes
changes in
authority, legal philosophy must be cognizant

JR., THE OCCASIONAL
187. OLIVER
187.
OLNER WENDELL HOLMES,
HOLMES, JR.,
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES
SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER
OLNER

WENDELL HOLMES 109 (Mark DeWolfe
DeWolfe Howe ed.,
ed., 1962).

Legal Pragmatism,
Pragmatism,41 STAN.
Holmes and Legal
188. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes
STAN. L. REV.
REv. 787, 788 (1989).
(1989).
supranote 187.
189. HOLMES,
HOLMES, supra
190. OLIVER
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (John Harvard Library 2009)
2009)
(1881).
(1881).
191. Holmes sought to expose the legal reasoning of judges for what it was-bound up
191.
with personal or political biases, while attempting to cast the decision as the result of pure
deduction.
of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
192. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic o/the
192.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 137 (Steven
INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY
LEGACY OF OLNER
(Steven J. Burton ed.,
accelerated under conditions of modernity,
2000). "When
"When change accelerated
modernity, explicit forward-looking
Id.
reform." ld.
legislation became the main instrument of rule specification and legal reform."
legislation
193. ROGER
COTTERRELL, LAW,
193.
ROGER COTTERRELL,
LAW, CULTURE
CULTURE AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE
THE MIRROR OF
and Norms:
An
Facts and
JtIrgen Habermas, Between Facts
SOCIAL THEORY 31 (2006); see generally
generally Jilrgen
Norms: An
Author's
Reflections,
76
DENY.
U.
L.
REv.
937
(1999)
(describing
the
relationship
between
(1999)
(describing
REV.
76
DENy.
Author's Reflections,
modem law and the moral conscience of society).
the form of modern
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94 In sum, "the only law that counts
the world of
of social
social beliefs
beliefs and values.
values. 1194
In
"the only law
legitimate is one
one that
that could
could be rationally
rationally accepted
accepted by
by all
aU citizens
citizens in a
as legitimate
195
opinion and
and will-formation."'
will-formation.,,195
discursive process
process of opinion
discursive

IV. The Federalization
Federalization of State Law Through
Through Preemption
Preemption and Federal
Federal
Common Law
Common
seemed to suggest
While
While the breadth of the language of CERCLA
CERCLA seemed
suggest a
radical
radical departure
departure from common
common law, as discussed above, it has not been
been
interpreted
interpreted that way. Indeed, the construction
construction and application
application of CERCLA
seems
resist a movement
movement that I call
call the "federalization
"federalization of property,"
property,"
seems to resist
increasing
introduction
the
other
areas
of
law.
By
this,
I
mean
in
occurring
occurring in other areas
By
I mean
increasing introduction
of
of federal preemptive
preemptive laws and preemptive
preemptive interpretation
interpretation of federal laws
laws
that
that overwhelm
overwhelm well-grounded
well-grounded common
common law principles.
principles. This is occurring
occurring in
different contexts: determinations
determinations as to when
when an interest
interest is
a host of different
97 what rights a transferee
96 when an interest terminates;'
cognizable;196
terminates;197
transferee
cognizable;'
198
99 the nature of a tenancy by the
receives;
198
of
recording
statutes;
199
receives;
the
effect
recording
1
2
00
20
entirety; when rights can be disclaimed ' and when an interest can
entirety;20o when rights can be disclaimed 201 and when an interest can

supranote
194. COTrERRELL,
COITERRELL, supra
note 193,
193, at 32.
1996).
195. JORGEN
JORGEN HABERMAS,
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND
AND NORMS 135 (William
(William Rehg
Rehg trans., 1996).
2000)
(acknowledging
that
federal
196. United
States
v.
Murray,
217
F.3d
59,
63
(1st
Cir.
United
Murray,
59,
(acknowledging
federal
law determines
determines whether a state law property
property interest existed).
1368, 1373
Cir. 2006)
197. Barclay
Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (holding that upon
Interim Trail Use or Abandonment,
Abandonment, the National
National Trail System Act
issuing a Notice
Notice of Interim
dictates when abandonment
abandonment or railway easements
easements occur).
198. United
United States
States v. Maclines,
Macinnes, 223 F. App'x 549, 553 (9th Cir. 2007)
2007) (holding that the
transferee
transferee who received
received property from the government that was taken by forfeiture received
title unburdened
unburdened by prior liens).
199.
199. AA Am. Dev. Corp. v. United States, No. CIV 06-2450-PHX-SMM,
06-2450-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist.
11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2007)
2007) (froding
(finding that the government need not
LEXIS
LEXIS 59692, at *10*10-11
record notice of impending taking of property).
200. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002). There,
There, the Court
Court redefined the
the
state law concept of a tenancy by the entirety by ruling that the Internal Revenue Service
could attach property held as tenancy by the entirety, based upon the husband's sole tax
liability; whereas under the common law, creditors of one spouse could not attach property
1291, 1296-97
1296-97 (Haw. 1997)
1997)
under those circumstances.
circumstances. See Sawado
Sawado v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291,
(discussing the history of this type of tenancy and finding
froding that the interest could not be
(discussing
one-third of the states still
attached based upon the liability of just one spouse). About one-third
Id.at 1294. On the other hand,
in its classical
classical form. ld.
recognize the tenancy by the entirety
entirety in
many states today allow a lien arising from the debts of one spouse to attach to entireties
Id.At most, the creditor
creditor
property, but the lien cannot be levied upon during the marriage. ld
(and
the
tenancy
becomes
a
tenancy
in
common)
recovers if the husband
and
wife
divorce
husband
becomes
common)
other. See,
See, e.g., V.R.W.,
V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 503 N.E.2d 496,
or if the debtor spouse survives the other.
yielding to the
the common law limits and
and concerns, it became
In not yielding
500 (N.Y. 1986). In
recast the nature of the common
common law interest, ignoring its most
necessary for the Court to recast
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°2 The law's validity
tenninate.2202
validity is
is threatened
threatened as courts
courts cast
cast off or
or
terminate.
some
reconfigure long-held
long-held conventions
conventions and understandings
understandings in
in favor of some
reconfigure
presumed dominant
dominant federal interest. This movement
movement is occurring
occurring in areas,
areas,
presumed
to be
be sure,
sure, where
where a federal interest
interest is present,
present, but
but also in many
many cases
cases where
that federal
federal interest would not necessarily
necessarily be frustrated
frustrated by observing
observing state
that
law limitations.
assertion
This
property results
results not
not only
only from the assertion
This recharacterization
recharacterization of property
20 33 but
preeminence of
of federal interests,
interests/0
but also from the insistence
insistence of
of
of the preeminence
"background principles."
principles." In Lucas v. South Carolina
Carolina Coastal
Coastal Council,
Council,
"background
detennining whether
whether a landowner
landowner had the right to construct
construct a dwelling
dwelling
determining
that
prohibited
use
regulations
land
along
the
waterfront
notwithstanding
land
regulations
that
prohibited
waterfront notwithstanding
along
construction, Justice
Justice Scalia explained
explained that such a right existed unless
unless there
construction,
limitation that inhered
inhered in the title that was found in some
was a limitation
4
0 That pronouncement
"background principle"
principle" under the common law. 2204
pronouncement
"background
expanded to include
became the new
new measure
measure of ownership
ownership rights and has expanded
In
not only principles
principles from state common law but any federal law. In
Pelagaic Fishing
Fishing Co.
taking of property
property
States, no taking
Co. v. United
United States,
American Pelagaic
occurred by the revocation
revocation of a pennit
permit to engage in fishing in the national
occurred
waters
pursuant
to
regulations
long after the permit
pennit was issued.202055
adopted
waters
The court found that a pervasive
pervasive regime of regulation was in place when
when
The
"existing rule" or
plaintiff purchased its ship, that there was an "existing
or
the plaintiff
principle" of federal law that inhered
inhered in plaintiffs
plaintiffs title and
"background principle"
"background

important
important characteristic.
(1999) (ruling that even though under state
201. Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999)
Revenue
law an heir could disclaim an inheritance, this would not preclude the Internal Revenue
Service from collecting taxes owed by that heir against the disclaimed interest;
created the legal fiction that the
notwithstanding that under state law, the disclaimer
disclaimer created
disclaimant predeceased
predeceased the decedent and consequently
consequently the dislaimant's share
share of the estate
id. at 52,
52, 54.
passed to the person next in line to inherit. Id.
(1985) (upholding
(upholding the Federal Land
202. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,
84, 108-09 (1985)
FLPMA required all
Policy Management
Management Act ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1744
1744 (2006)). The FLPMA
of
Management within three years of
recorded with the Bureau of Land Management
mining claims to be recorded
passage
passage of the Act and thereafter, on an annual basis, a filing of notice of intention to hold a
affidavit of assessment of work done on the claim, the claim was
claim, along with an affidavit
"[e]ven
otherwise extinguished; explaining that "[
e]ven with respect to vested property rights, a
in
regulatory constraints on the way in
legislature generally
generally has the power to impose new regulatory
performance of
of
those rights are used, or to condition their continued retention on performance
which those
Id at 104.
certain affirmative duties." Jd.
See, e.g., United States v. Stadium Apartments, 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
203. See,
cert.
denied,
(1970) (denying a mortgagor a state right to redeem where the
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970)
foreclosing mortgagee is the federal government).
(1992).
1003, 1029-30 (1992).
204. See 505 U.S. 1003,
1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
205. 379 F.3d 1363,
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therefore
owner can
can never
never be certain
certain of
of the
the
therefore burdened
burdened it.202066 As aa result, an owner
contours
property if the
the government
government could
could at any
any time adopt
adopt
contours of his property
regulations
regulations under
under aa regulatory
regulatory scheme
scheme limiting
limiting his
his ownership
ownership in ways
ways that
that
were not plain
plain at the time the interest
interest was acquired.
In Bair
Bair v. United States, "background
"background principles"
principles" were employed
employed to
in
time,
in
favor of the
claimants
who
were
prior
defeat
the
interests
of claimants
were prior
defeat
United States, under a federal
federal loan
loan program
program which conferred
conferred super-lien
super-lien
United
07
status.2207
The
status.
The court
court determined
determined that
that the statute created "a
"a pre-existing
pre-existing
limitation on the
the property
property rights that the [claimants]
[claimants] could
could acquire
acquire under
under
20 8
claimants challenged
The claimants
state law.",
law.,,208
challenged the government's
government's assertion
assertion of
of
priority
priority on the
the ground,
ground, among
among other things, that the statute purported
purported to
create property
property rights in contravention
contravention of the principle
principle that only states
states can
can
209
220
create
these
property
rights.
09
If
Congress
could
create
and
define
property
Congress
create
property
create
define property
rights, the claimants
claimants argued, the result would
would be an end-run
end-run around
around the
210
Takings Clause.
Clause.2IO
The Federal Circuit took the opposite view that a federal
categorical takings
"background principle"
statute can serve as a "background
principle" in categorical
takings
Supreme Court
Court previously
previously held that federal law
decisions. It noted that the Supreme
of
can limit
limit state-created
state-created property
property interests.
interests. 221 However, by the inclusion
inclusion of

Id.at 1379.
206. ld.
1379. The Magnuson Act
Act was
was enacted to take immediate
immediate action to conserve
and manage
of the
the United States; the rights created
created
manage the
the fishery resources found off the coast of
purported to grant to
by the Act necessarily
necessarily included the right to fish, and nothing in the act purported
id.
owners of fishing privileges a property right to fish. See id.
207. 515 F.3d 1323,
1323, 1325,
1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id.
208. ld.
at 1326.
1326.
Id.at 1327.
209. ld.
1327.
210. Id.
ld. at 1327 n.1.
1003, 1029
(1992));
211. ld.
Id.at 1327-28 (citing Lucas
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029 (1992»;
1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
also Maritrans
Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344,
see also
2003)
or
("'[B]ackground
source, such as state, federal, or
('''[B]ackground principles'
principles' derived from an independent source,
of
common
property rights for purposes of
common law, define
defme the dimensions
dimensions of the requisite property
1030)). But see Cienega
taking." (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030».
establishing
establishing a cognizable
cognizable taking."
Cienega
Gardensv.v. United
United States,
Gardens
States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003), where that same court seemed to
government's
have reached the limits of its indulgence in this theory. It rejected the federal government's
concept in an effort to impose specific limitations on rights of parties who
assertion of the concept
government
Id. at 1330-31.
1330-31. Through new regulations, the government
had received
received government benefits. ld.
prepaying loans it had guaranteed, which would have
sought to preclude owners from prepaying
permitted the owners to charge market rents for the housing built with the guaranteed funds.
The court found that despite the existence of a set of regulations governing the program
when the loans were taken out, the power of the agency to adopt new regulations was not a
Id. at
redefine the property held by the owners. ld.
"background principle" as would enable it to redefme
"background
1331. The new regulations would have changed the interest from one in which the owner
1331.
could expect free and unfettered control after twenty years, to one in which the original
Id.at 1323-24. The court rejected the notion that the
burdens would continue
continue indefinitely. ld.
burdens
existence of a regulatory scheme gives rights to adopt regulations, even if they are not
existence
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2 12 the burdens of clean
defense,212
the burdens of clean
provisions such
such as
as the
the innocent
innocent landowner
landowner defense,
provisions
up under
under CERCLA
CERCLA would
would not
not fall upon
upon all
all new
new owners
owners by
by way
way of
of
up
background principles.
principles.
background

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Incursions into the realm
realm of state
state property
property law, altering
altering settled
settled
Incursions
meanings in
in order
order to achieve
achieve very
very narrow
narrow federal
federal interests,
interests, is an assault
assault on
on
meanings
legal theory
theory and
and frustrates
frustrates its
its historical
historical role. Legal
Legal theory
theory seeks
seeks specifically
specifically
legal
to develop
develop a theoretical
theoretical understanding
understanding of
of the nature
nature of
of law
law as
as a social
social
to
phenomenon. It
It aims at rationality
rationality in legal
legal doctrine-necessary
doctrine-necessary for its
its
phenomenon.
understanding and forecasting
forecasting outcomes
outcomes and for seeing
seeing how
how legal rules
rules and
and
understanding
2 13
regulations fit within
within a rational structure,
structure, their linkages
linkages and relationships.
relationships.213
regulations
It may involve
involve a search
search for "purposive
"purposive unity of
of law, so that
that all
all its elements
elements
fundamental objective
of some fundamental
objective
to be
be interpreted
interpreted and
and evaluated
evaluated in terms of
are to
thought
are
they
which
political)
examRle
social,
moral,
economic,
or
political)
which
economic,
social,
(for example
' 2 14
serve." 14
to serve.
To some, unity as a practical
practical matter
matter entails two forms of
of
To
predictability:
predictability:
[P]redictably consistent
consistent internal relationships
relationships of elements (rules,
[P]redictably
system....
principles, concepts,
concepts, decisions,...)
decisions, ... ) within a legal system
....
principles,
predictably consistent external relationships between
between the
[and] predictably
system and what lies outside it, so that the determination of the
legal from the non-legal (for example,
example, legal rules from moral
political
rules; judicial
decisions
from
political decisions) can be a
215
one.
reliable one?15

application of concepts
But the rationality of law disinte~ates
concepts are
disintegrates when the application
pragmatic rather than principled. 16
CERCLA is at once sweeping in its aims, yet imprecise in its
CERCLA
expression. This circumstance could have been taken as a blank slate by
courts, enabling
enabling a wholesale
wholesale crafting of a new rights and liability regime
with broad aims and draconian results. But the courts have been cautious,
not have
reasonably foreseeable, or that participants in government programs could not
Id. at 1347-48.
1347-48.
reasonable investment-backed
investment-backed expectations. Id.
1238 (D. Mon.
Co, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1238
212. See supra
note 9; Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Co,
supra note
2003) (discussing
section of CERCLA precluding recovery of natural resource damages
(discussing section
landowner defense,
the innocent landowner
of the
discussion of
occurring
of the
the statute). For aa discussion
before passage of
occurring before
Harbor
Carson Harbor
Cir. 1996) and Carson
F.3d 706 (3d Cir.
Co., 96 F.3d
see
Realty Co.,
v. CDMG
CDMG Realty
see also United States v.
Cir. 2001).
F.3d 863 (9th Cir.
v. Unocal
Unocal Corp., 270 FJd
Village,
Village, Ltd v.
6.
166, at 6.
note 166,
supra note
COTTERRELL, supra
213. See COITERRELL,
Id.at 9.
214. Id.
10.
Id. at 10.
215. Id.
215.
id
at 6.
216.
See
216. See id. at
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finding preemption
preemption of state common law principles
principles sparingly
sparingll217
and
otherwise yielding
yielding to those principles
principles that serve the ends of fairness and
21 8 The
predictability.
predictability.218
courts have taken pains to ensure that CERCLA
CERCLA does
not apply indiscriminately,
too
harshly,
or
to
persons
who
cannot
indiscriminately,
persons
cannot fairly be
said to share any responsibility
responsibility for the harm sought to be remedied. In
In
interpretation most
setting these contours, courts have resorted to tools of interpretation
likely to yield sensible and rational applications. While the ordinary
ordinary
dictionary
dictionary is often the first tool they employ, they have endeavored to moor
moor
their interpretations
particularly since
interpretations to existing state law principles, particularly
property
property interests are at stake. Property relations have historically been
been
expectations and understandings
governed by state law, and the expectations
understandings derived
derived
therefrom urge that the federal standard should be rooted in an adoption of
of
state property law. As recent
recent cases show, a federal common
common law of property
is unsettling; it subjects citizens to two regimes where rights and definitions
are at variance and dispute outcomes depend largely
largely on the regime in
which the citizen
citizen happens to find herself and between whom the contest
contest
arises, that is, individual
individual versus individual
individual or individual versus the federal
versus the federal government,
government. If it is individual versus
government, it may mean
that the federal government will win, not because
because it has the more
meritorious case, but because it is the federal government. Understanding
Understanding
decisionmaking.
CERCLA teaches
teaches us about purposive decisionmaking.

217. See
See United States v. General
General Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2005)
2005)
(discussing the caution courts must employ before adopting
adopting a federal rule).
218. Canadyne-Georgia
Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank,
NationsBank, N.A., 183 F.3d 1269, 1273 (1lth
(11th Cir.
1999) ("The question of whether
'owner' under
whether a particular defendant
defendant can be deemed an 'owner'
1999)
CERCLA...
... turns on application of state law ......"); United
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
CERCLA
51,
(determining that state common
"owner" and "operator"
"operator"
51, 62-64 (1998)
(1998) (determining
cornmon law determines "owner"
liability
relationship).
liability in the context of a corporate parent and subsidiary relationship).
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